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ABSTRACT
Positive and negative affect are often thought to influence the cognitive performance of
individuals and groups via their effects on two different dimensions of cognitive processing
style: heuristic vs. systematic processing, and global vs. local attentional focus. Recently,
research has suggested that the effects of affective states on the analytic and creative
performance of individuals depend on the relative dominance of heuristic vs. systematic
processing (for analytic performance) and of a global vs. local attentional focus (for creative
performance) just prior to the affect’s arousal (Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2014; Huntsinger &
Ray, 2016).
Extending this individual-level evidence to small interacting groups, the two experiments
reported here examined whether the effect of positive and negative affective states on group
performance—decision-making (Study 1) and creative idea generation (Study 2)—depends on
the relative dominance of heuristic vs. systematic processing (Study 1) and global vs. local
attentional focus (Study 2) in group members just before the affective state was induced. Study
1 primed either heuristic or systematic processing and then induced either a happy or sad mood
state (in that order). I hypothesized that when heuristic processing was initially primed, groups
subsequently put into a sad mood would make more accurate decisions than groups subsequently
put into a happy mood, while when systematic processing was initially primed, groups
subsequently put into a happy mood would make more accurate decisions than groups
subsequently put into a sad mood. Study 2 primed group members’ global vs. local attentional
ix

focus and then induced either a happy or sad mood state (again, in that order). I hypothesized
that when a global attentional focus was initially primed, groups subsequently put into a happy
mood would be more creative than groups put into a sad mood, while when a local attentional
focus was initially primed, groups subsequently put into a sad mood would be more creative than
groups put into a happy mood. I found support for all of these hypotheses. Limitations and
implications of the studies are discussed, and direction for future research are suggested.

x

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Groups are basic task-performing units in modern organizations, and the success of
organizations heavily depends on whether groups perform their assigned tasks well. As a result,
task performance by small groups has received much research attention not only in social
psychology (e.g., Levine & Moreland, 2012; Moreland, Hogg, & Hains, 1994; Wittenbaum &
Moreland, 2008) but also in other organization-related areas (e.g., Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, &
Gilpson, 2008; Sanna & Parks, 1997). Although in general groups can be effective, one of the
robust findings in the literature is that groups do not always maximize their own potential
(Hackman, 1998; Larson, 2010; Steiner, 1972). For example, groups often fail to bring to bear
some of the varied perspectives of their members, leading to sub-optimal decisions (Larson,
Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998; Stasser & Titus, 1987). Sometimes, this results in
disastrous decision outcomes (e.g., groupthink; Janis, 1982). Group interaction also inhibits
creativity in workgroups. For instance, interacting groups tend to generate fewer ideas than do
the same number of individuals working separately (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Mullen, Johnson, &
Sala, 1991). Such findings have stimulated much research illuminating the antecedent conditions
that either promote or hinder effective group performance (for reviews, see, Hackman & Katz,
2010; Larson, 2010; Levine & Moreland, 2012). Although this previous research has advanced
our understanding of group performance, some variables have received less attention than others.
One neglected but important variable is the affective state that group members experience while
1
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preforming a task. The positive or negative affect (e.g., happiness, sadness) that members might
share has been shown to play an important role in how they think and behave at work (for
reviews, see, George, 2016; Barsade & Knight, 2015). Yet, research on the role of affective
states in group performance remains scarce compared to research on how affective states
influence many aspects of individual performance (e.g., judgment, decision-making, &
creativity). To help fill this void, the present dissertation examined how the affective states
shared among group members influence their collective performance on both decision-making
and creativity tasks.
Affective states are generally thought to influence the cognitive performance of
individuals and groups via their effects on two different dimensions of cognitive processing
style: heuristic vs. systematic processing, and global vs. local attentional focus (e.g., Bramesfeld
& Gasper, 2008; Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001a; Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2014; Schwarz,
2012). The conventional assumption underlying most previous research in this area is that
positive affect leads to heuristic processing and a global attentional focus, while negative affect
leads to systematic processing and a local attentional focus (e.g., Schwarz, 2001, 2012; Schwarz
& Clore, 2007). Systematic processing, relative to heuristic processing, generally benefits
analytic performance, whereas a global attentional focus, relative to a local focus, generally
benefits creative performance (Huntsinger & Ray, 2016; Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky,
2007; Visser, Van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & Wisse, 2013).
The distinction between heuristic and systematic processing styles represents a difference
in the amount of effortful, elaborated thinking brought to the task at hand (Evans, 2008).
Systematic processing is characterized by deep, analytic, logical thinking. It draws on
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considerable cognitive resources and demands substantial mental effort (Petty & Cacioppo
1986). In contrast, heuristic processing is characterized by the use of simple, easy-to-apply rules
and cognitive shortcuts (e.g., stereotypes, intuition, common sense, and rules of thumb; Evans,
2008). Heuristic processing allows one to make judgments quickly on the basis of salient, easyto-comprehend cues, as opposed to painstakingly scrutinizing all available decision-relevant
information (Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2012). Thus, compared to systematic processing, heuristic
processing involves a comparatively superficial and less effortful thinking style that makes
relatively few cognitive demands.
Research on the effect of heuristic vs. systematic processing on group performance has
been conducted primarily with complex decision-making tasks (e.g., group decision-making with
distributed information; Galinsky & Kray, 2004; Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001; Scholten,
Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007; Van Ginkel, Tindale, & Van Knippenberg, 2009).
Decision-making can be defined as a process of gathering decision-relevant information,
evaluating the merits of multiple alternatives, and then selecting the choice alternative that seems
most likely to be the best. Because this process can benefit from an in-depth and comprehensive
treatment of decision-relevant information, heuristic vs. systematic processing has been the
distinction of interest when people perform complex decision-making and analytic problem
solving tasks.1
Regarding the distinction between a global and local attentional focus, people are able to
perceive the same object in different ways. They can “zoom out” and attend to objects as a

I do not draw a clear distinction between “(complex) decision-making” and “(analytical) problem solving,” and use
these terms interchangeably throughout this paper.
1
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whole (i.e., global aspects of the target), or “zoom in” and attend to its parts (local aspects of the
target) (Förster & Dannenberg, 2010). A global vs. local focus thus refers to what aspects of a
stimulus become the focus of attention. For instance, when separate targets (e.g., whales and
sharks) are presented, a global focus results in more attention being paid to the similarities and
relational features between them (e.g., they both have a dorsal fin and swim in the sea), while a
local focus results in more attention being paid to their dissimilar parts and contrasting features
(e.g., a whale is larger than a shark, and a whale is a mammal while a shark is a fish) (Förster &
Dannenberg, 2008; Förster, Liberman, & Kuschel, 2008).
Variations in the scope of perceptual attention are associated with variations in the scope
of conceptual attention (Förster, 2012; Förster & Dannenberg, 2008). Specifically, a global
perceptual focus leads to spreading activation to conceptually distant concepts in memory, which
in turn leads to the activation of broad, abstract, and superordinate ideas (Friedman, Fishbach,
Förster, & Werth, 2003). By contrast, a local perceptual focus leads to the activation of concepts
that are less abstract and are conceptually more closely-related in memory (Friedman et al.,
2003). For example, people who have a local focus are more likely than those who have a global
focus to come up with the concept “dog” in response to the concept “cat,” two ideas that are
conceptually proximal in memory. In contrast, when considering the concepts “dog” and “cat,”
people who have a global focus are more likely than those who have a local focus to come up
with the concept “house,” a conceptually more remote idea (Friedman et al., 2003; Mednick,
1962). The activation of conceptually remote ideas often leads to new or unconventional
combinations among them, and is positively associated with generating creative products
(Mednick, 1962; Ward, 1994, 1995). In support of this view, Friedman et al. (2003) found that
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individuals primed with a global attentional focus performed better at creativity tasks than did
individuals primed with a local attentional focus. Thus, global vs. local attentional focus has
been the processing distinction of interest when people perform creative tasks.
Building on this body of work, all of which was done with individuals, the current
dissertation comprises two laboratory experiments that examine how heuristic vs. systematic
processing (Study 1) and global vs. local attentional focus (Study 2) are triggered by group
members’ affective states, and in turn influence the group’s collective decision-making (Study 1)
and creative performance (Study 2), respectively. The present research is concerned with
transitory affective states and cognitive processing styles that change situationally and so
potentially can be manipulated. Below, I describe in more detail what heuristic vs. systematic
processing and global vs. local attentional focus are, and how these two dimensions are similar to
and different from one another. I then discuss their distinct implications for complex decisionmaking and creativity tasks. This is followed by a brief review of research on the link between
affective states and these two dimensions of cognitive processing style. Lastly, I presented two
experiments that test my hypotheses that cognitive processing styles (i.e., heuristic vs. systematic
processing for Study 1 and global vs. local attentional focus for Study 2) and affective states (i.e.,
happiness, sadness) interactively predict the decision-making (Study 1) and creative performance
(Study 2) of small groups.
Cognitive Processing Styles
Like individuals, groups are often viewed as information processors (De Dreu, Nijstad, &
Van Knippernberg, 2008; Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Larson & Christensen, 1993).
Indeed, many tasks assigned to groups in organizations entail intellectual and cognitive activities
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(e.g., attention, learning, processing and sharing information; Hinsz et al., 1997; Salas, Rozell,
Mullen, & Driskell, 1999). Thus, it seems reasonable that cognitive processing style, which is
the way that group members engage in cognitive activities, might affect group performance on a
variety of cognitive tasks, just as it affects individual performance on such tasks (De Dreu et al.,
2008; Tindale & Kameda, 2000, Tindale, Meisenhelder, Dykema-Engblade, & Hogg, 2001). To
perform such tasks effectively, group members should adopt the cognitive processing style that is
best suited for the group’s task. The current research focuses on the impact of heuristic vs.
systematic processing on group performance on a complex decision-making task (Study 1), as
well as the impact of global vs. local attentional focus on group performance on a creativity task
(Study 2).
According to dual-process theories (Chaiken, 1980; Evans, 2008; Petty & Cacioppo
1986), people are presumed to employ at any given moment one of two contrasting information
processing styles, either a relatively effortful, systematic style or a less effortful, heuristic style.
Because systematic processing draws on considerable cognitive resources, and because human
beings tend to be cognitive misers who are generally hesitate to exert unnecessary cognitive
efforts, heuristic processing is assumed to prevail over systematic processing most of the time
(Chen et al., 1999; Fiske & Taylor, 2008). Heuristic processing relies on stereotypes and rules of
thumbs stored in memory. As such, when people adopt a heuristic processing style, they do not
spend much energy judging information and message validity. As a consequence, they are often
more subject to cognitive mistakes and judgment bias (e.g., sexism) than when they adopt a
systematic processing style (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). For example,
research on persuasion has shown that compared to when they engage in systematic processing,
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when people engage in heuristic processing, their attitudes are more influenced by the
messenger’s expertise and attractiveness than by the quality or strength of the message’s
arguments, as the former is usually easier to comprehend than the latter (Chaiken, 1980; Petty,
Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). Like expertise and attractiveness, gender can be a heuristic cue
that is less cognitively demanding to judge. People often hold the prejudiced belief that male
applicants are more competent and appropriate for an engineering position than female
applicants, even when male and female applicants have the same qualifications (Foschi, Lai, &
Sigerson, 1994). Research has shown that, relative to systematic processing, heuristic processing
exacerbates this gender bias in employee selection decision-making, because heuristic processing
leads to the activation and application of gender stereotypes (Rijnbout & McKimmie, 2012).
The other cognitive dimensions of interest here, global vs. local focus, refers to whether
the scope of perceptual attention is directed broadly or narrowly (Förster & Dannenberg, 2008).
To demonstrate the difference between a global focus and a local focus, Navon (1977) showed
participants large letters that were constructed using a different small letter (see Figure 1). It was
found that people attended to the entire structure of the stimuli (“H” in this example) before
paying attention to their local elements (“F” in this example).
Figure 1. Sample item from the Navon-letter-task (Navon, 1977).
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People can shift very easily between focusing on the global vs. local aspects of a given
situation, but the default tendency is a global focus. In other words, a global focus not only takes
precedence over a local focus (as Navon’s, 1977, results suggest), it is dominant for most people
(called the global superiority effect; Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 1977). The
idea that one’s attentional focus can be either globally or locally oriented was advanced many
years ago by Gestalt psychologists (Koffka, 1963; Wertheimer, 1967), and has received renewed
attention in connection with a variety of social psychological topics such as creativity (Friedman
et al., 2003), similarity/dissimilarity judgments (Förster et al., 2008), and affective feelings
(Gasper & Clore 2002; Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010). Förster and colleagues (Förster,
2012; Förster & Dannenberg, 2008) have developed a unifying framework for understanding
global vs. local focus. They identified the antecedent conditions (e.g., affect) that promote either
a global or local attentional focus and described how either a global or local focus can carry over
to other tasks such as creativity and social judgments (presented below in detail).
Heuristic vs. systematic processing (the extent of effortful thinking) and global vs. local
focus (the scope of perceptual attention) are conceptually different dimensions of cognitive
processing style. People must attend to information prior to processing it. Therefore, in theory,
whether they attend to information broadly or narrowly (i.e., global vs. local focus) is
independent of whether the information focused on is thoroughly processed or not (i.e.,
systematic vs. heuristic processing). But it is difficult to tease apart these two dimensions in both
real-world and experimental settings, because heuristic vs. systematic processing is often
confounded with global vs. local focus (Bramesfeld & Gasper, 2008; Clore et al., 2001a):
heuristic processing most commonly appears to entail a global rather than a local focus, whereas
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systematic processing seems more often to involve a local rather than a global focus (Clore et al.,
2001a). For example, when processing information in a careful, systematic way, people tend to
engage in a narrow and detail-oriented focus. In a similar vein, when people make use of easily
accessible stereotypes and rules of thumbs (i.e., heuristic processing), they not only take
cognitive shortcuts but also make use of global, superordinate concepts (Bramesfeld & Gasper,
2008; Clore et al., 2001a). In line with this, people seem to use both heuristic processing and a
global attentional focus more often than they use systematic processing and a local attentional
focus (Evans, 2008, Fiske & Taylor, 2008). This further encourages the entanglement of the
heuristic vs. systematic processing and global vs. local focus dimensions.
Although heuristic vs. systematic processing and global vs. local attentional focus are
often intertwined, it is not the purpose of the current dissertation to disentangle their effects.
Rather, this dissertation focuses separately on the impact of heuristic vs. systematic processing
on analytic group decision-making (Study 1), and the impact of global vs. local attentional focus
on group creative idea generation (Study 2). That is, heuristic vs. systematic processing has the
most obvious implications for analytic problem solving and complex decision-making, while
global vs. local focus has more distinct implications for creative activities. Indeed, many
researchers have distinguished the cognitive processes that enhance creative performance from
those that improve problem solving (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2005a, 2005b; Huntsinger & Ray,
2016; Markman et al., 2007; Martindale, 1995; Nijstad, De Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010;
Visser et al., 2013). For example, Nijstad et al. (2010) argued that complex decision-making and
analytic problem-solving tasks benefit from effortful, systematic processing that entails intense
analyses of existing knowledge and relevant new information and ideas, whereas creativity tasks
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benefit from broad attention, and unsystematic, flexible processing that leads to unusual
associations by synthesizing conceptually remote ideas stored in memory.
In the sections that follow, I summarize some of the major findings from the affectcognition literature. Specifically, I discuss how positive and negative affect are related to the
two previously discussed pairs of cognitive processing dimensions: heuristic vs. systematic
processing style and global vs. local attentional focus.
The Relationship Between Affective State and Cognitive Processing Style
Before discussing the link between affect and cognition, it is important first to clarify the
definition of “affective state.” The term affect (or affective) refers to an underlying experience of
feeling, emotion, or mood (Hogg, Abrams, & Martin, 2010), and a state is a temporary condition
of an organism (Clore, Wyer, Dienes, Gasper, Gohm, & Isbell, 2001b). Affect is often used as
an umbrella term to refer to emotions and mood states. The distinction between emotions and
moods is that emotions generally have a salient focal object (e.g., one is angry at or happy about
something), while moods do not involve a clear focal object. Because mood states are not
object-focused, they are more transitory, and readily dissipate over time relative to emotions
(Clore & Schnall, 2005). Affective states are different from affective dispositions (e.g., negative
affectivity; Watson & Clark, 1984). The latter refers to chronic tendencies to experience positive
or negative affect. Following prior research concerned with affect and group decision-making
and creativity (e.g., Bramesfeld & Gasper, 2008; Emich, 2014; Grawitch, Munz, Elliott, &
Mathis, 2003a; Grawitch, Munz, & Cramer, 2003b; Kooij-de Bode et al., 2010; Van
Knippenberg et al., 2010), in the current dissertation I focus on general positive and negative
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affect—operationalized as happy and sad mood states—rather than on specific emotions like joy
and anger. I use affective states and mood states interchangeably throughout this paper.
The Affect-as-Information Model
The link between affect and cognition has been the focus of much research in psychology
and related fields. One notable theoretical approach that has received much attention in the
affect-cognition literature is the affect-as-information model (Clore et al., 2001a; Schwarz &
Clore, 2007, Schwarz, 2001, 2012). This model postulates that affective feelings provide
information about the state of one’s environment. Specifically, negative affect (e.g., sadness) is
presumed to be a warning that there is a problem (e.g., danger) in the environment, and so
activates systematic processing and a local attentional focus, because such detail-oriented styles
of cognitive processing can help to identify the nature and likely cause of the problem (Clore et
al., 2001b; Schwarz, 2001; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). By contrast, positive affect (e.g.,
happiness) is assumed to signal a benign environment, one that is safe, satisfactory, and
nonproblematic. In benign environments there is less need for a detail-oriented style of cognitive
processing, as heuristic processing and a global attentional focus should fare just as well. Thus,
positive affect is thought to allow heuristic processing and a global attentional focus, because
they are presumably no less effective when the environment is benign.
Based on the affect-as-information model, many empirical studies have examined how
positive and negative affect influence judgment, decision-making, and creativity. On complex
decision-making tasks, which are relevant to Study 1 of the present discussion, a number of
studies have found that, relative to negative affect, positive affect encourages a comparatively
shallow processing style by relying on judgmental rules and cognitive heuristics (e.g.,
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Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Ruder & Bless, 2003). For example, people in happy
moods are less likely to consider the quality of a persuasive message that requires cognitive
efforts to comprehend than those in neutral and sad moods. Rather, relative to sad people, happy
people tend to rely more on a communicator’s expertise, which is easily comprehend in a
persuasion context (Schwarz, Bless & Bohner, 1991). These findings are also in line with the
prior studies on persuasion and heuristic vs. systematic processing (i.e., Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken
& Mahesqaran, 1994; Petty, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1997). Moreover, compared to sad moods,
happy moods make people more vulnerable to cognitive mistakes and judgment biases because it
increases their reliance on superficial and heuristic reasoning, resulting in less intensive
treatment of available information (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Melton,
1995). For instance, on the well-known “Linda” conjunction fallacy problem (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983), people read a short paragraph about an outspoken female student who is
described as being particularly interested in discrimination and social justice issues. Then, they
are asked to decide which is more likely: (a) Linda is a bank teller and a feminist, or (b) Linda is
a bank teller. In fact, the likelihood of two independent events co-occurring, which describes
alternative (a), is necessarily lower than the likelihood of either one occurring separately, which
describes alternative (b). Nevertheless, when performing this task, people tend to think that the
conjunction of the two events is more likely than either one occurring alone, because the
paragraph they read makes them over-rely on easily accessible knowledge (i.e., Linda just seems
like a feminist), instead of taking account of other possibilities. Research shows that people in a
happy mood, who are assumed to engage in heuristic processing, appear to commit the
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conjunction fallacy more than do those in a sad mood, who are assumed to engage in systematic
processing (Clore et al., 2001a; Gasper, 1999).
On creativity tasks, which are relevant to Study 2 of this dissertation, numerous studies
have shown that positive affect appears to enhance creativity through a global attentional focus
that activates original thinking and cognitive flexibility, whereas negative affect appears to
hinder creativity through a local focus that inhibits those thought processes (e.g., Gasper, 2004;
Hirt, Devers, & McCrea, 2008; Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki, 1987; but see also, Gasper, 2003;
George & Zhou, 2002). For example, Isen et al. (1987) found that relative to neutral moods or
sad moods, happy moods improved creative problem solving as indicated by performance on
Duncker’s (1945) candle task and Mednick’s (1968) Remote Associates Test (called, RAT).
Gasper (2004) also examined the relationship between affective states and creative idea
generation, and found that happy individuals generated more creative ideas than sad individuals.
An Affect-as-Cognitive-Feedback Account
As reviewed above, much research has provided supportive evidence for the idea that
negative affect leads to better decision-making by activating a systematic processing style, while
positive affect improves creativity performance by activating a global focus. In other words,
these studies, most of which have been conducted under the affect-as-information model, suggest
a fixed (dedicated) link between affective states and cognitive processing styles. They state that
positive affect always triggers heuristic processing and a global attentional focus, while negative
affect always triggers systematic processing and a local attentional focus.
However, recently it has become apparent that the link between affective states and
cognitive processing styles is likely more flexible (malleable) than the affect-as-information
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model posits; positive affect may not always trigger heuristic processing and a global attentional
focus, and negative affect may not always trigger systematic processing and a local attentional
focus. This is the view taken by the affect-as-cognitive-feedback account recently proposed by
Huntsinger et al. (2014; for other complementary approaches, see Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer,
1993; Petty & Briñol, 2015). According to this alternative perspective, positive and negative
affect, rather than being linked to any particular information processing style, serve instead as
feedback about the appropriateness of whatever processing style is currently at play, and so
signal whether that style should be maintained or changed. Specifically, a positive mood (i.e.,
happiness) serves as a “go” signal, in that it encourages the continued use of the current
processing style. In contrast, a negative mood (i.e., sadness) serves as a “stop” signal that
discourages the continued use of the current processing style and prompts instead a shift in style.
Thus, the processing style that prevails following a mood induction should depend both on the
valence of the induced mood (positive or negative) and on the processing style in use just before
the mood induction occurred. For instance, as seen in Figure 2, when heuristic processing (or a
global attentional focus) is currently in use, a happy mood is predicted to lead to the continued
use of heuristic processing (or global attentional focus), while a sad mood is predicted to prompt
a switch to systematic processing (or a local attentional focus). Conversely, when systematic
processing (or a local attentional focus) is currently in use, a happy mood is predicted to
encourage the continued use of systematic processing style (or local attentional focus), whereas a
sad mood is predicted to prompt a shift to heuristic processing (or a global attentional focus).
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Figure 2. Affect-as-Cognitive-Feedback Model (Huntsinger et al., 2014).
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Heuristic
processing
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Empirical evidence supporting this account has recently begun to accumulate at the
individual level (e.g., Huntsinger, 2012; Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2012; Huntsinger & Ray,
2016). For example, Huntsinger and Ray (2016, Experiment 4) primed participants to use either
a heuristic or systematic processing style, and then subsequently induced a happy or sad mood.
They found that when heuristic processing was initially primed, individuals who were later put in
a happy mood made more cognitive mistakes and judgment errors than did those later put in a
sad mood. But when systematic processing was initially primed, the opposite occurred: happy
individuals made fewer cognitive mistakes and judgment errors than did sad individuals.
Although the former result is predicted by the more traditional, fixed-link affect-as-information
model (Clore et al., 2001a; Gasper. 1999), the latter result is not. By contrast, both results are
predicted by the flexible-link affect-as-cognitive-feedback account. Moreover, when a global
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attentional focus was initially primed, happy moods, relative to sad moods, increased
performance on a creative idea generation task (Experiment 1) as well as on the Remote
Associates Test (Mednick, 1962) and insight problem-solving tasks (Schooler, Ohlsson, &
Brooks, 1993) (Experiment 2). These results are in line both with the affect-as-cognitivefeedback model and with prior works conducted under the affect-as-information model (e.g.,
Gasper, 2004; Isen et al., 1987). However, when a local attentional focus was initially primed,
this pattern reversed: sad individuals performed better at the creativity tasks than did happy
individuals. This pattern is also predicted by the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model, but it is not
predicted by the affect-as-information model. In order to reconcile such findings with the affectas-information model, Huntsinger et al. (2014) argued that the reason why many results do seem
to support the earlier, fixed-link model is likely due to the fact that previous studies did not
experimentally control participants’ cognitive processing style before introducing the mood
induction, and because heuristic processing and a global attentional focus are more likely to have
been the default styles used by participants at the outset of those experiments. In other words,
the link between affect and cognitive processing style only appears to be fixed, because the
cognitive processing style employed by participants prior to the mood induction tended to be
fixed.
Although the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model has been successful in accounting for a
number of intra-individual processes, its ability to predict and explain intra-group processes has
not been tested. Thus, a question can be raised as to whether the influence of affective states on
group performance on decision-making and creative tasks depend on the cognitive processing
style (heuristic vs. systematic processing, and global vs. local attentional focus) in use by

17
members just before the affective state is induced. To address this question, the present research
extends the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model to small interacting groups. I hope that such
efforts can offer new insights into an area that has suffered from too little research and too many
contradictory findings.

CHAPTER TWO
STUDY 1
Introduction
The main objective of Study 1 is to examine how heuristic vs. systematic processing and
positive vs. negative affect interactively influence group performance on a complex decisionmaking task. An example of a complex decision-making task that demands substantial
information processing is the hidden profile task (Stasser, 1988), which involves group decisionmaking with distributed information. In a hidden profile task, the positive and negative attributes
of the various choice alternatives are asymmetrically distributed among group members, such
that some information is given to all of the members (hereafter referred to shared information),
while the rest is evenly divided among them (hereafter referred to unshared information). The
group’s goal is to determine which choice alternative is best. In this experimental setting, the
best solution is determined by the amount of positive and negative information that is given.
Therefore, in order to perform the task well, it is necessary to process the available information
carefully.
Importantly, prior to discussion, attributes favoring the objectively best choice alternative
in the hidden profile task are usually distributed among members as unshared information, while
those favoring the suboptimal alternatives are distributed as shared information. As a result, the
superiority of the best alternative is usually not apparent to—is “hidden” from—group members
prior to discussion, because each member individually holds more information favoring one of
18
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the suboptimal alternatives. In order to recognize and collectively choose that best alternative,
during discussion groups must attend carefully to the unshared information their members hold.
If instead group discussion focuses on the exchange of members’ choice preferences rather than
the exchange of information that they hold (Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1997), or if they discuss
more their shared than their unshared information (Larson et al., 1998), a low quality group
decision is likely to result. Further, even when all of the task-relevant information is fully
shared, group members still must evaluate that information fairly, regardless of whether it is
consistent or inconsistent with their original preferences (for a detailed review, see Broadbeck,
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007). If instead they evaluate preference-consistent
information as being more important and credible than preference-inconsistent information
(Brodbeck et al., 2007; Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003), then again a low quality group
decision is likely to result.
Using the hidden profile paradigm, a number of studies have tested the prediction that
group performance on analytic problem solving and decision-making tasks benefits from
systematic and elaborated thinking (e.g., Scholten et al., 2007; Van Ginkel et al., 2009; see for a
comprehensive review, Schippers, Edmondson, & West, 2014). For example, Scholten et al.
(2007) had groups perform a decision-making task in which their members each initially held a
unique subset of the task-relevant information. Prior to starting this task, half of the groups were
exposed to a process accountability manipulation intended to boost their systematic processing of
task-relevant information relative to groups in a control condition. Specifically, groups in the
process accountability condition were told that at the end of the experimental session they would
be asked to explain their decision-making process, whereas groups in the control condition did
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not expect to have to explain their decision-making process. According to prior research (e.g.,
De Dreu et al., 2008), process accountability encourages group members to engage in deep and
thorough information processing. It was found that groups in the process accountability
condition reported being more motivated to process information systematically, and in fact
exchanged and discussed more of their critical, uniquely held task information, than did groups
in the control condition. As a result, groups in the process accountability condition were more
likely to choose the best choice alternative than were groups in the control condition.
More relevant to Study 1 of this dissertation, Yoon and Larson (2018) primed group
member with either a heuristic or systematic processing style and examined its effect on their
decision accuracy in a hidden profile task. In that study, members first made a preliminary
choice based on an initial, incomplete set of information that was constructed to encourage them
to prefer one of the sub-optimal choice alternatives. Then, they performed an allegedly unrelated
priming task that was designed to instantiate either a heuristic or systematic processing style
(Huntsinger & Ray, 2016). After priming the cognitive processing style, members received the
full set of decision-relevant information (i.e., all of the information they has seen before, plus
additional, unshared information), which, taken as a whole, suggested that the initially-preferred
alternative was actually not the best. So, if they processed all of the decision-relevant
information in a thorough, systematic way, they should have change their initial, incorrect choice
preference. Consistent with this prediction, Yoon and Larson (2018) found that participants
primed to engage in a systematic processing style were more likely to correctly solve the hidden
profile problem than those primed to engage in a heuristic processing style. Along with the
findings reported by Scholten et al. (2007), these results support the baseline assumption that,
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other things being equal, a systematic processing style results in better decision-making in a
hidden profile task than does a heuristic processing style.
Affective States within Groups: Group Decision-Making
Affective states and emotions are contagious (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993; Pugh,
2001). They are often transmitted between members in a group without conscious awareness
(Neumann & Strack, 2000; Sy, Côté, & Saavedra, 2005; Visser et al., 2013). Although a few
studies have shown that the affective states shared among group members can influence various
aspects of group functioning (e.g., George, 2016; Barsade & Knight, 2015), relatively little
research attention has been given to these effects compared to the effects observed at the
individual level of analysis. Moreover, to my knowledge, no research has examined the flexible
link between affective states and cognitive processing styles (i.e., the affect-as-cognitivefeedback model; Huntsinger et al., 2014) in small interacting groups. Rather, most research
investigating affect in groups appears to have been conducted under the assumption of a fixed
link between affect and cognitive processing style (i.e., the affect-as-information model;
Schwarz, 2012). Nevertheless, some of the findings from those studies are difficult to reconcile
with the affect-as-information model, as described below.
Given that systematic processing leads to better decisions than heuristic processing
(Scholten et al., 2007; Yoon & Larson, 2018), the implication of the fixed-link, affect-asinformation model for group decision-making seems straightforward. When performing
complex decision-making tasks, groups in a negative mood should be more apt to engage in
systematic information processing than those in a positive mood. Consequently, groups in a
negative mood should also tend to make better decisions than those in a positive mood.
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However, prior research on the relationship between member affect and group decision-making
effectiveness has produced contradictory results. On the supportive side, Kooij-de Bode et al.
(2010) found that groups made higher quality decisions when their members were high rather
than low in dispositional negative affectivity (i.e., the predisposition to experience negative
affect; Watson & Clark, 1984). Likewise, Van Knippenberg et al. (2010) found that groups
produced higher quality decisions after being exposed to a negative rather than positive mood
manipulation, though this occurred only for groups whose members were low in dispositional
negative affectivity; those high in dispositional negative affectivity tended to produce higher
quality decisions regardless of which mood manipulation condition they were in. On the other
hand, in two studies by Bramesfeld and Gasper (2008) it was found that groups made better
decisions after being exposed to a positive rather than negative mood manipulation. And Emich
(2014) found that groups with one member in a positive mood made better decisions than did
groups with either one member in a negative mood or all members in a neutral mood. These
latter results are perplexing because they seem to imply that the less analytic, heuristic
information processing style presumed by the fixed-link, affect-as-information model to be
prompted by positive affect is more effective when making complex group decisions than is the
effortful, detail-oriented, systematic processing style presumed to be prompted by negative
affect. The affect-as-information model appears incapable of explaining these inconsistent
results. Such mixed findings suggest that the impact of affective states on group decisionmaking effectiveness may be more complicated than the affect-as-information model presumes.
It thus seems reasonable to question the notion that positive affect always leads to
heuristic processing and a global attentional focus, while negative affect always promotes
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systematic processing and a local focus. Instead, a more flexible linkage may exist between
affect and cognition, such as is proposed by the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model (Huntsinger
et al., 2014). A flexible-link approach offers new insights that may help to make sense of the
previous contradictory results found in the group decision-making literature (i.e., Bramesfeld &
Gasper, 2008, Van Knippenberg et al., 2010). Indeed, there are some hints that the link between
affect and cognition may be more flexible than once thought. For example, Bramesfeld and
Gasper (2008) found that happy groups focused more on critical decision-relevant information
and relied less on their pre-discussion choice preferences than did sad groups, suggesting that
their happy groups were in fact using a more systematic processing style than were their sad
groups. Similarly, Emich (2014) found that groups with one member in a positive mood both
requested and exchanged more information with one another than did groups with one member
in a negative mood, again suggesting that positive moods can sometimes prompt an effortful,
systematic processing style. Thus, both studies seem to imply that better group decisions likely
did result from effortful, systematic information processing, and so call into question the
assumption of a fixed relationship between affect and cognitive style.
Drawing on the affect-as-cognitive-feedback account, Yoon, Larson, and Huntsinger
(2018) recently obtained preliminary evidence for the idea that the impact of a mood
manipulation on group decision-making depends on whether a heuristic or systematic processing
style was at play just prior to the mood induction. Similar to previous research investigating the
impact of mood on group decision-making, participants in the study performed a hidden profile
task in 3-person groups (adapted from Larson, Sargis, Elstein, & Schwartz, 2002). Participants
first made a preliminary decision based on an incomplete set of information they were initially
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given, some of which they shared in common with others, and some that they held uniquely.
After making that preliminary decision, their cognitive processing style (heuristic vs. systematic)
and then their mood states (happy vs. sad) were manipulated (in that order). Then, the
experimenter provided each participant a copy of the information that the other two members of
his/her group held, in addition to a fresh copy of the information that he/she already had. Doing
so gave group members access to all of the task-relevant information. Lastly, participants
individually made a final choice based on all of the information. Because their initial
information packet was not complete, and because the full set of task-relevant information was
asymmetrically distributed so as to create a hidden profile, the best choice alternative was not
readily apparent to members when they made their preliminary decisions. As a consequence,
most participants initially chose a sub-optimal alternative. In order to select the best alternative
as their final choice, participants had to engage in systematic processing of the information
subsequently received. At the very end of the session, participants performed an unannounced
recall test to measure how much attention they had paid to the information (Mojzisch, & SchultzHardt, 2010). The surprise recall test listed all of the decision-relevant information that they
were previously given, but omitted the names of the choice alternatives to which the information
belonged. Participants were asked to identify the alternative to which each item of information
referred.
The results were consistent with the affect-as-cognitive-feedback predictions. When
heuristic processing was instantiated, members subsequently put in a sad mood tended to pay
more attention to the unshared information—as evidence by their being better able to recall the
choice alternatives to which that information belonged—and made more accurate decisions than
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happy members did. This result is consistent with both the affect-as-information model and the
affect-as-cognitive-feedback model. However, when systematic processing was instantiated, the
reverse pattern emerged: members subsequently put in a happy mood paid more attention to
unshared information and made more accurate decisions than sad members did. This result too is
in line with the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model, but not with the affect-as-information
model.
The findings from Yoon et al. (2018) help to make sense of the seemingly contradictory
pattern of results found in previous research on the relationship between affect and group
decision-making effectiveness. Their results suggest that the link between affect and cognition
may be more flexible than previously thought, including in contexts that closely parallel group
decision-making. However, an obvious limitation of the study by Yoon et al. (2018) is that
group members never actually interacted with one another. Although three participants attended
each session and were asked to consider themselves a group during the experiment, they did not
actually discuss the task materials with one another. Instead, an information exchange between
members was simulated simply by providing every member a copy of what every other member
had allegedly read. Further, after receiving that information, members made their final decisions
individually, not as a group. Therefore, the Yoon et al. (2018) findings should be replicated in
freely interacting groups. An interactive group setting in which members meet face-to-face to
discuss their information and make a collective decision may include other influential variables
that were not considered in the preliminary study. Replicating with truly interactive groups
would provide further support for the idea that the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model can
integrate the previous mixed findings. Study 1 aimed to provide that replication.
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Consistent with previous research (i.e., Bramesfeld & Gasper, 2008; Emich, 2014;
Scholten et al., 2007; Van Knippenberg et al., 2010), Study 1 was a laboratory experiment in
which undergraduate students were assembled in three-person groups and performed a hiddenprofiles task. At the outset of the experiment, the task-relevant information about two choice
alternatives was asymmetrically distributed among group members, such that some information
was given to all of the members, whereas the rest was evenly divided among them. Heuristic vs.
systematic processing and happy vs. sad moods were manipulated independently just before the
members began their discussion, but after they had privately read their individual information
and had reported which choice alternative they personally thought was best. Specifically, after
making a preliminary judgment about which choice alternative seemed best based on their own
individual subset of the information, members performed individually two unrelated tasks. To
mitigate potential demand effects, these tasks were introduced as part of another researcher’s
pilot study, but in reality they were designed to manipulate heuristic vs. systematic processing
and happy vs. sad moods, respectively (described in detail below). Upon completion of the
purported pilot study, participants started discussion. Their goal was to decide as a group which
alternative as best in light of all available information. In Study 1, I tested the following three
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: When group members are initially primed to engage in heuristic
processing, subsequently inducing a sad mood will produce more accurate decisions than will
inducing a happy mood. But when group members are initially primed to engage in systematic
processing, subsequently inducing a sad mood will produce less accurate decisions than will
inducing a happy mood.
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Hypothesis 2: When group members are initially primed to engage in heuristic
processing, subsequently inducing a sad mood will lead them to process unshared information
about the various choice alternatives more deeply than will subsequently inducing a happy
mood. But when they are initially primed to engage in systematic processing, subsequently
inducing a sad mood will lead them to process unshared information less deeply than will
subsequently inducing a happy mood.
Hypothesis 3: The interaction anticipated by Hypothesis 1 will be mediated by the
degree to which groups focus on their unshared information during discussion. Specifically, a
heuristic processing prime followed by a sad mood induction, and a systematic processing prime
followed by a happy mood induction, will both lead to greater relative focus during discussion
on unshared information than will either a heuristic processing priming followed by a happy
mood induction or a systematic processing priming followed by a sad mood induction, and
greater relative focus during discussion on unshared information will in turn lead to more
accurate decisions.
Study 1 Method
Participants and Design
A prospective power analysis was conducted to estimate the required sample size for
Study 1. I used the interaction effect size observed for individuals in the preliminary study
(ηp2 = .104; Yoon et al., 2018) to estimate the expected interaction effect size for groups. That
analysis suggested that for power = .80 and α = .05, a total sample size of 70 groups should be
sufficient.
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Thus, 216 students who were enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Loyola
University Chicago were recruited for Study 1 and took part in the study for partial fulfillment of
a course requirement. Three participants were scheduled for each of 72 experimental sessions,
and each session was randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (processing style:
heuristic vs. systematic) x 2 (mood state: happy vs. sad) complete factorial design. I excluded
from my analyses two groups where one or more members chose the correct alternative as their
initial preference. It is important to note that in Study 1 I was interested in the extent to which
group members could overcome an initial incorrect choice preference by processing decisionrelevant information in a thorough, systematic way. This is the central reason for having
employed a hidden profile decision-making task. To that end, an initial packet of information,
read privately by each member in the first phase of the experiment was constructed so as to
encourage a preference for the sub-optimal choice alternative. This was done because
participants who might otherwise favor the best choice alternative at the outset can shed no light
on the performance implications of the cognitive processing style and affect manipulations (cf.
Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Faulmüller, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2010;
Mojzisch, & Schultz-Hardt, 2010). However, the results are not meaningfully changed by
including these groups.
Decision Task
I adapted for this research the drug-choice task previously used by Larson et al. (2002).
The materials consisted of written descriptions of two hypothetical cholesterol-lowering drugs
(referred to as Chol-BLUE and Chol-GREEN). Each drug was described by eleven unique
attributes, with each attribute being unambiguously either positive or negative. Specifically,
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Chol-BLUE had 7 positive and 4 negative attributes, while Chol-GREEN had 5 positive and 6
negative attributes (22 attributes in total). Thus, when considering the full set of information,
Chol-BLUE should have been seen as objectively best. Participants were to decide as a group
which drug was more likely to become commercially successful.
Three separate reading packets were constructed from this information, with 10 attributes
listed in all three packets (shared information) and 12 attributes evenly divided among them
(unshared information). Each packet described 3 positive and 4 negative attributes for CholBLUE, and 5 positive and 2 negative attributes for Chol-GREEN. Thus, each packet was
constructed so as to make Chol-GREEN seem best, and to obscure the overall superiority of
Chol-BLUE. A complete description of the information distribution is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Drug-Choice Task Information Distribution (Study 1).
Alternative
Information type and values

Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

Positive

1

5

Negative

4

0

Positive

6

0

Negative

0

6

Positive

3

5

Negative

4

2

7
4

5
6

Shared information

Unshared information

Information available to each member

Full information available to the group
Positive
Negative
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Procedure
Upon arrival, the three participants in each session were initially seated in separate
cubicles and were informed that during the session they would participate in two ostensibly
separate studies, a two-part “group decision-making study” and a pilot study for another
researcher. The procedure unfolded in three phases.
Phase 1: Initial decision preference. The three participants were told that they would
perform a two-part group decision-making task in which they were to decide which of two
cholesterol-lowering drugs was more likely to become commercially successful. In this first part
of the task, they each received one of three different information packets, and were told that
some of the information in that packet was also in the packets given to the other two members of
their group, but that some of it was in their packet alone. They were then given 15 minutes to
study the packet. While doing so, they were allowed to take notes, which they could then refer
to later during their group discussion. At the end of 15 minutes, participants privately indicated
on a drug preference sheet which drug they personally thought was more likely to become
commercially successful, after which all materials were collected by the experimenter.
Phase 2: Processing style and affect manipulations. Next, participants learned that
there would be a brief delay as the experimenter prepared the second part of the group decisionmaking task. While waiting, they performed individually a word completion task and a “Life
Events Inventory.” These were used to manipulate their cognitive processing style and mood,
respectively. These two tasks were alleged to be part of a pilot study for another researcher.
The cognitive processing style manipulation occurred first, and had two elements. The
first was the word completion task. It required participants to identify the single letter missing
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from each of 15 words presented on a computer screen (e.g., mis_ing). In the heuristic
processing condition, 10 of the words related to heuristic thinking or action (e.g., intuitive,
quick), while in the systematic processing condition, 10 of the words related to systematic
thinking or action (e.g., analytical, investigative). To help conceal the purpose of this task, 5
neutral words (i.e., colossal, small) were also included in both conditions. This task has been
used successfully in prior research as an effective method of priming either heuristic or
systematic cognitive processing (e.g., Huntsinger, 2011; Huntsinger & Ray, 2016, Yoon &
Larson, 2018).
The second element of the cognitive processing style manipulation consisted of
informing participants in the systematic processing condition that they would be asked during an
interview at the end of the study to explain the decision-making process they used during the
main experiment. This was mentioned just prior to performing the word completion task.
Participants in the heuristic processing condition did not receive this instruction. The purpose of
this instruction was to bolster the systematic processing manipulation by making participants in
that condition feel more accountable for the decisions they made. Previous research has shown
that when groups expect to have to explain their decision-making process, they are more likely to
engage in an effortful, analytic, information-driven style of decision-making than when they do
not expect to have to explain the process (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2008; Scholten et al. 2007).
Next, after learning about the end-of-experiment interview (in the systematic processing
condition) and performing the word completion task, participant next completed a “Life Events
Inventory” designed to induce either a happy or sad mood. Participants were asked to write as
vividly and in as much detail as possible about an event that made them feel either “really
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happy” or “really sad.” They did this for 8 minutes while listening via earphones to music that
previously has been shown to induce either happy (Mozart’s “Eine Kleine Nacht Musik”) or sad
moods (Mahler’s “Adagietto”; Huntsinger, Clore, & Bar-Anan, 2010). To confirm the efficacy
of this mood induction task, we conducted an independent pretest sample of n = 56 participants.
They performed this task under similar conditions, but then immediately rated their mood on six
7-point scales (happy, sad, good, bad, positive, and negative; α = .89). As expected, they
reported significantly more positive affect in the happy mood condition than in the sad mood
condition; t (54) = 7.60, p < .001, d = 2.03. No interaction among participants was permitted
during either Phase 1 or Phase 2.
Phase 3: Group discussion and decision. The three participants were then moved from
their separate cubicles to a common large table where they were to complete the second part of
the group decision-making task. Their individual drug preference sheets and hand-written notes
from Phase 1 were returned to them. The purpose of returning the individual drug preference
sheets was to help ensure that at the beginning of discussion all members were aware of the
decision preference of their groupmates (cf. Mojzisch, & Schultz-Hardt, 2010), and indeed,
groups usually did begin their discussion by sharing their pre-discussion preferences. Groups
were then given 10 minutes to discuss the two drugs and to decide collectively which drug was
more likely to become commercially successful.
Finally, after making their decision, all materials were collected and participants
individually performed an unannounced recall test to measure how much attention they had paid
to the drug information (cf. Mojzisch, & Schultz-Hardt, 2010). The recall test listed all 22 drug
attributes, but omitted the names of the drugs to which they belonged. Participants were asked to
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identify the drug to which each item referred. After completing the recall test, participants were
debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Dependent Variables
Group Decision Accuracy. The main dependent variable was whether groups chose the
objectively best alternative. Group decision accuracy was coded as either correct (1= CholBLUE) or incorrect (0 = Chol-GREEN).
Recall Performance. I also analyzed group members’ performance on the surprise recall
test in order to assess their depth of information processing, under the assumption that the more
deeply and systematically they processed the drug information, the more likely they were to have
paid attention to that information and be able to recall it later (cf. Mojzisch & Schultz-Hardt,
2010). Specifically, I computed the proportion of shared and (separately) unshared information
recalled by each member, then averaged across members to yield two average recall scores for
each group.
Discussion Focus. Lastly, in order to examine how discussion of the drug information
influenced decision accuracy, I video recorded each group during Phase 3 of the experiment.
These recordings were coded by two trained research assistants who were blind to both the
research hypotheses and the experimental conditions. They carefully viewed each recording
several times, and identified each mention of a drug attribute by matching each member’s
statements to a master list of attributes. To be marked as mentioned, a specific, clear statement
of the attribute had to be made at least once. Other aspects of the discussion were not coded.
According to a simulation study by Stasser (1992), a group’s decision accuracy may depend
more on their relative focus during discussion on unshared information than on simply the
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absolute amount of unshared information they mention. So, from the coded discussions I
computed a discussion focus score that captured each group’s relative focus during discussion on
their unshared information. That score was defined as the number of items of unshared
information that were mentioned at least once (i.e., repetitions were not counted) divided by the
total number of items of the drug information of ether type (shared or unshared) that were
mentioned (cf. Stasser & Stewart, 1992; Stewart & Stasser, 1998; Toma & Butera, 2009). One
group was not recorded due to a technical problem with the recording equipment, and four others
mentioned none of the drug attributes at all during their discussion. Consequently, a discussion
focus score could not be computed for these five groups. This explains the lower-than-expected
degrees of freedom in the discussion focus analyses.
The coders each independently scored approximately two-thirds of the group recordings,
with one-third of them (24) scored by both coders. Because our discussion focus measure is
based on counts of shared and unshared information mentioned, we correlated the counts
obtained from the twice-coded recordings to assess inter-coder reliability (intra-class
correlation; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979). The analysis revealed that inter-coder reliabilities were
excellent; ICC (3, 2) = .987 for the number of items of shared information mentioned, and ICC
(3, 2) = .998 for the number of items of unshared information mentioned.
Study 1 Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 1). Independent variables were
coded as 1 = systematic processing and happy mood, -1 = heuristic processing and sad mood.
Note, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01.
Variables
1. Cognitive Processing Style
2. Affective States
3. Group Decision Accuracy
4. Proportion of shared information
recalled
5. Proportion of unshared information
recalled
6. Proportion of discussion focused on
unshared information

M
.03
.00
.25
.93

SD
1.00
1.00
.43
.05

1
.00
-.05
-.18

2

3

4

5

.03
-.14

-.33**

-

.67

.17

-.05

.03

.46**

-.15

-

.40

.18

.02

.00

.30*

-.12

.66**

6

Table 3. Decision Accuracy, Recall Performance, and Discussion Focus (Study 1). Note, * for
this measure, the ns are, left-to-right, 16, 16, 16, and 17.
Heuristic processing

Systematic processing

Happy mood
(n = 17)

Sad mood
(n = 17)

Happy mood
(n = 18)

Sad mood
(n = 18)

Dependent variables

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Group decision accuracy

.12 (.33)

.41 (.51)

.39 (.50)

.06 (.24)

Proportion of shared
information recalled

.94 (.05)

.94 (.05)

.91 (.06)

.94 (.05)

Proportion of unshared
information recalled

.64 (.18)

.73 (.16)

.72 (.13)

.61 (.17)

Proportion of discussion
focused on unshared
information *

.33 (.24)

.46 (.11)

.47 (.09)

.34 (.21)

Group Decision Accuracy. Hypothesis 1 predicted that when group members were
initially primed to engage in heuristic processing, subsequently inducing a sad mood would
produce more accurate decisions than would inducing a happy mood, but when members were

-
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initially primed to engage in systematic processing, subsequently inducing a sad mood would
produce less accurate decisions than would inducing a happy mood.
To test this prediction, a binary logistic regression was performed with cognitive
processing style (1 = systematic, -1 = heuristic), affect (1 = happy, -1 = sad), and their interaction
as predictors, and decision accuracy as the dependent variable. That analysis revealed a
significant interaction effect; B = 1.01 (SE = .36), Wald χ2 (1, N = 70) = 7.76, p = .005. In
support of Hypothesis 1, and as can be seen in Table 3, when heuristic processing was initially
primed, groups were more likely to choose the correct alternative in the sad mood condition (M
= .41) than in the happy mood condition (M = .12); χ2 (1, N = 34) = 4.25, p =.039. By contrast,
when systematic processing was initially primed, groups were less likely to choose correctly in
the sad mood condition (M = .06) than in the happy mood condition (M = .39); χ2 (1, N = 36) =
6.89, p = .009. Neither the cognitive processing style main effect nor the affect main effect were
significant; ps > .53 for both.
Recall Performance. Hypothesis 2 predicted that when group members were initially
primed to engage in heuristic processing, subsequently inducing a sad mood would lead them to
process the unshared drug information more deeply than would inducing a happy mood, but
when members were initially primed to engage in systematic processing, subsequently inducing
a sad mood would lead them to process the unshared drug information less deeply than would
inducing a happy mood. This hypothesis was tested using participants’ recall performance as a
proxy for depth of processing. Because participants received all of the shared information before
being exposed to the manipulation of processing style and affect, but receive two-thirds of the
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unshared information afterwards, I expected a between-condition recall difference for the latter
but not for the former.
Consistent with this expectation, a 2 (processing style) by 2 (affect) analysis of variance
(ANOVA) revealed a significant interaction between initial processing style and affective state
on the proportion of correctly recalled unshared information, F (1, 66) = 6.79, p = .011, ηp2
= .093; all other F < 1. As can be seen in Table 3, when systematic processing was initially
primed, groups correctly recalled more of the unshared information in the happy mood condition
(M = .72, SD = .13) than in the sad mood condition (M = .61, SD = .17); F (1, 66) = 4.11, p
= .047. On the other hand, when heuristic processing was initially primed, groups tended to
correctly recall more unshared information in the sad mood condition (M = .73, SD = .16) than in
the happy mood condition (M = .64, SD = .18). However, this latter comparison did not meet a
conventional level of statistical significance, F (1, 66) = 2.77, p = .101. Thus, while a significant
interaction was observed, it seemed due more to the effect of the mood manipulation when
systematic processing was initially primed than to its effect when heuristic processing was
initially primed. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was only partially supported in this experiment.
As expected, when the same analysis was performed with the proportion of correctly
recalled shared information as the dependent variable, the interaction effect was not significant,
F (1, 66) = .73, p = .396, ηp2 = .011. Nor was there a significant main effect of either processing
style or affect, F (1, 66) = 2.16, p = .146, ηp2 = .032 and F (1, 66) = 1.34, p = .251, ηp2 = .020,
respectively.
Discussion Focus. Hypothesis 3 predicted that the interaction between initial processing
style and subsequently manipulated mood on group decision accuracy would be mediated by the
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groups’ relative focus during discussion on the unshared drug information. As part of this, it was
expected that the heuristic processing prime would lead to greater focus on the unshared
information when it was followed by the sad rather than the happy mood induction, and that the
systematic processing prime would lead to greater focus on the unshared information when it
was followed by the happy rather than the sad mood induction.
In support of this prediction, a 2-way ANOVA using the discussion focus measure as the
dependent variable revealed a significant interaction effect, F (1, 61) = 10.02, p = .002, ηp2
= .141. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, and as can be seen in Table 3, when heuristic processing
was initially primed, during their subsequent discussion groups focused more on their unshared
information in the sad mood condition (M = .46, SD =.11) than in the happy mood condition (M
= .33, SD = .24); F (1, 61) = 5.01, p = .029. By contrast, when systematic processing was
initially primed, groups focused more on their unshared information in the happy mood condition
(M = .47, SD = .09) than in the sad mood condition (M = .34, SD = .21); F (1, 61) = 4.99, p
= .029. Neither main effect was significant, both ps > .82.
Finally, to test the mediation effect predicted by Hypothesis 3, I tested the significance of
indirect effect using the percentile bootstrapping method with 5,000 bootstrapped samples
(Hayes & Preacher, 2014). The interaction between cognitive processing style and affect was the
predictor in this analysis, discussion focus was the putative mediator, and decision accuracy was
the dependent variable (see Figure 3). We found both a statistically significant indirect effect, B
= .37, 95% CI [.05, 1.16], and a significant direct effect, B = .80, p = .027, 95% CI [.09, 1.51].
Note that the path from the mediator to the dependent variable in this model, controlling for the
independent variable, was nonsignificant. However, Hayes (2018, p. 116) argues that the
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indirect effect can be significant, thus indicating mediation, even if one or more of the individual
coefficients in the indirect path are not significant. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 3, the
interactive impact of processing style and affect on the groups’ collective decision accuracy
appears to have been mediated at least in part by the degree to which they focused on their
unshared information during discussion.
Figure 3. Mediation model. Note. A value in parentheses reflects the inclusion of the mediator
in the equation. **p < .01, *p < .05, +p < .14.

.38**
*
Processing Style
x
Affect

Discussion Focus

.35** (.29*)

.19+

Group Decision
Accuracy

Study 1 Discussion
Drawing on the affect-as-cognitive-feedback account proposed by Huntsinger et al.
(2014), I predicted that the influence of positive and negative affect on group decision-making
performance would depend on whether group members were engaged in heuristic or systematic
information processing just before the affective state was aroused. Analyses revealed support for
this prediction. In line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, when systematic processing was initially
primed, subsequently inducing positive affect prompted greater attention to critical decisionrelevant information, and ultimately more accurate decision making, than did inducing negative
affect, while the reverse occurred when heuristic processing was initially primed. Moreover,
consistent with Hypothesis 3, the degree to which groups focused on their unshared information
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during discussion mediated the interaction between processing style and affect on their collective
decision accuracy. These findings suggest that (a) performance on hidden profile decisionmaking tasks benefits from systematic information processing, (b) negative affect tends to
prompt a shift in information processing style whereas positive affect does not, and so (c)
whether positive or negative affect improves or impairs group decision-making quality in a given
situation depends critically on the cognitive processing style that members are engaged in at the
moment that affect is first aroused. In other words, member affect appears to have a flexible
rather than fixed influence on information processing and decision-making quality in groups.
The findings of Study 1 help to make sense of the seemingly contradictory pattern of
results found in previous research on the relationship between affect and group decision-making
effectiveness. As noted earlier, most past research in this area seems to have proceeded under
the assumption that positive affect generally encourages heuristic processing, while negative
affect encourages systematic processing, with the implication that groups experiencing negative
affect should, on average, produce higher quality decisions than those experiencing positive
affect. However, while some studies confirm this pattern (e.g., Kooij‐de Bode, et al., 2010; Van
Knippenberg, et al., 2010), others contradict it (e.g., Bramesfeld & Gasper, 2008; Emich, 2014).
The results of Study 1 suggest that the “contradictory” nature of this literature may actually be an
illusion created by having assumed a fixed link between affect and information processing style.
If we instead assume—as the affect-as-cognitive-feedback account suggests—that there is no
dedicated link between the two, then either high or low quality decisions might be expected
when members are put into either a positive or negative mood, depending on the information
processing style in use when the affective state is aroused. Researchers who wish to examine the
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impact of member affect on the intellective performance of groups should be mindful of this
more complex, flexible relationship. Knowing whether group members are engaging in heuristic
or systematic processing at the moment an affect manipulation is introduced appears to be
critical for predicting the impact of such manipulations (cf. Clore & Huntsinger, 2007).
In Study 1, I demonstrated that the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model can be usefully
applied at the group-level of analysis. While prior research with this model has focused
exclusively on intra-individual processes (e.g., Huntsinger et al., 2014; Huntsinger & Ray, 2016),
Study 1 provided the first evidence for the idea that it can help as well in understanding the role
of affect in intra-group processes.

CHAPTER THREE
STUDY 2
Introduction
Whereas Study 1 focused on testing the interaction of affect and heuristic vs. systematic
cognitive processing on decision-making in interacting groups, Study 2 tested the interaction of
affect and another dimension of cognitive processing style, global vs. local attentional focus, and
did so in a different domain of group performance: creativity. As described earlier, global vs.
local attentional focus refers to the variation in the scope of attention, and has been the
processing distinction of interest when people perform creative tasks. A typical task that
involves creativity is idea generation. Creativity is commonly conceptualized as the generation
of ideas, products, or solutions that are both novel (original) and useful (appropriate or feasible)
(Amabile, 1996; Paulus & Nijstad, 2019). Since a creative product or solution often comes out
of a creative idea, idea generation is regarded as a first step toward organizational innovation and
social change (Paulus & Dzindolet, 2008; Paulus, Dzindolet, & Kohn, 2012). A novel (original)
idea is often defined as one that is new, unusual or rare (e.g., Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Harvey,
2013; Paulus, 2000). For example, if someone thinks of an idea that other people have already
mentioned or that is habitually mentioned, that idea is not considered original. In this regard, the
ability to go beyond pre-existing, familiar ideas and mental sets is indispensable in creative idea
generation (Choi & Yoon, 2018; Smith, 2003). When generating ideas on a topic, most people
usually begin by searching for relevant concepts and knowledge in their long term memory
42
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(Nijstad & Strobe, 2006; Ward, 1994). Individual’s long-term memory can be viewed as an
associative semantic network representing inter-connected nodes, where each node represents a
concept (e.g., Anderson, 2013; Brown, Tumeo, Larey, & Paulus, 1998; Collins & Loftus, 1975).
Depending on the level of abstraction, concepts represented as inter-connected nodes can be
referred to ideas or categories. For example, if one treats “chair” and “desk” as ideas, they can
be conceptualized as being within the same category (e.g., furniture) because those ideas are
conceptually close. Similarly, if one considers “chair” as a category, then “three-leg chairs” and
“four-leg chairs” would be classified as ideas within that category.
In the representation of memory as an associative semantic network, it is assumed that
closely connected ideas (e.g., desk, table, & chair) within the same category (e.g., furniture) are
more likely to activate one another than less closely connected ideas (e.g., desk, whale, &
airplane) from different categories (e.g., furniture, animal, and transportation, respectively). For
instance, if the idea “desk” is activated in memory, “table” or “chair” are more likely to follow it
than “whale” or “airplane.” The latter two ideas, derived from different categories, would be
regarded as an infrequent or unusual compared to the former two, given that the initial idea is
“desk.” Thus, original ideas are often achieved through spreading activation to conceptually
remote (less closely connected) categories in memory (e.g., Amabile, 1983; Mednick, 1962;
Osborn, 1963; Simonton, 1999). In general, it is expected that the more unusual the categories
considered, the more likely it is that original combinations of ideas will come to mind (e.g.,
Nijstad et al., 2010). Indeed, ideas derived from categories that are not habitually considered
together are usually evaluated as being more original (e.g., Kohn & Smith, 2011).
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To summarize, creative idea generation benefits from being able to move readily between
conceptually distant categories (Choi & Yoon, 2018; Guilford, 1967; Mednick, 1962; Simonton,
1999). A global attentional focus is presumed to facilitate such movement, while a local
attentional focus inhibits it (Förster & Dannenberg, 2010). A global attentional focus should
therefore improve performance on creativity tasks relative to a local focus, a prediction that has
been empirically supported at the individual level (e.g., Friedman et al., 2003). Based on the
foregoing arguments, I expect that group creativity too may benefit from a global (as opposed to
local) attentional focus.
Affective States within Groups: Group Creativity
Previous research suggests that positive affect (e.g., happiness) improves individual
creativity because positive affect activates a global attentional focus that is beneficial for
creativity performance (e.g., Gasper, 2004; Hirt et al., 2008; Isen et al., 1987). Extending these
individual-level findings to small interacting groups, a handful of studies have also examined the
effect of affective states on group creativity. For instance, Grawitch et al. (2003a) investigated
how group members’ mood influences their collective idea-generating performance. They found
that groups produced more original ideas when a happy mood was induced than when a neutral
mood (neither positive nor negative) were induced. Further, Grawitch et al. (2003b) examined
the effects of positive, neutral, and negative mood states on group creativity using a creative
production task. It was found that groups in positive moods made more creative products than
those in neutral and negative moods. These results are in line with prior individual-level studies
conducted under the affect-as-information model (e.g., Gasper, 2004; Hirt et al., 2008; Isen et al.,
1987). However, it should be noted that all of those previous studies have been conducted under
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the assumption of a fixed link between affect and cognition, and thus did not manipulate
participants global vs. local attentional focus prior to inducing the mood states. Given that a
global attentional focus is often the default processing orientation (Fiske & Taylor, 2008;
Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 1977), it seems reasonable to speculate that in those studies the
introduction of negative affect caused members to switch from a global to a local attentional
focus, while positive affect encouraged them to hold fast to the global focus.
Again, no research to date has directly examined whether the impact of mood states on
group creativity depends on the relative dominance of global vs. local attentional focus. Even in
the studies by Grawitch et al., (2003a, 2003b), participants’ initial attentional focus was not
experimentally controlled. Thus, it remains untested whether the effect of affective states on
group creativity would depend on the relative dominance of global vs. local attentional focus just
before the mood induction.
On the basis of the affect-as-cognitive-feedback account (Huntsinger et al., 2014;
Huntsinger & Ray, 2016), in Study 2, I predict an interactive effect of global vs. local attentional
focus and happy vs. sad moods on group creativity. As in Study 1, cognitive style and affective
states were manipulated independently and individually. In Study 2, however, either a global or
a local attentional focus (as opposed to heuristic or systematic processing) was primed, because
thinking broadly or narrowly is more relevant to ideational creativity than is thinking intuitively
or analytically.
Consistent with previous research, I adopted a group brainstorming paradigm to
investigate ideational creativity in groups (e.g., Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Paulus & Dzindolet,
1993). Brainstorming is one of the most widely-used techniques for studying creative idea
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generation in groups (Osborn, 1963; Sutton & Hargadon, 1996), and it has been employed for a
long time in real world organizational settings (e.g., Paulus & Nijstad, 2019; Paulus, Korde,
Dickson, Carmeli, & Cohen-Meitar, 2015). In this experiment, group members collaboratively
produced ideas on how to improve their university (Goldenberg, Larson, & Wiley, 2013; Kohn,
Paulus, & Choi, 2011; Putman & Paulus, 2009). This topic has been widely used in the extant
literature on brainstorming because it is assumed to be important and relevant to the
undergraduate samples that have often been employed in experimental studies of group
creativity. Specifically, undergraduate participants usually have direct experience with and
relevant knowledge about that topic, just as workgroup members in organizations usually have
direct experience with and relevant knowledge about the topics they consider. Thus, even
though the research is conducted with ad-hoc groups consisting of undergraduate students, the
findings can be generalized to real world.
Research on group brainstorming has typically examined group creativity in terms of the
quantity and quality of the generated ideas (see Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Guilford, 1967; Nijstad
& Stroebe, 2006; Paulus et al., 2001). Consistent with this research tradition, I assessed both
quantitative and qualitative aspects of group creativity – the sheer number of non-redundant
ideas generated by a group (fluency), the number of idea categories used (flexibility), and idea
originality (originality). In Study 2, the following hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis 4: When a global attentional focus is initially primed, groups subsequently
put into a happy mood will generate more ideas than will groups subsequently put into a sad
mood. By contrast, when a local attentional focus is initially primed, groups subsequently put
into a sad mood will generate more ideas than groups subsequently put into a happy mood.
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Hypothesis 5: When a global attentional focus is initially primed, groups subsequently
put into a happy mood will consider more idea categories than will groups subsequently put into
a sad mood. By contrast, when a local attentional focus is initially primed, groups subsequently
put into a sad mood will consider more idea categories than groups subsequently put into a
happy mood.
Hypothesis 6: When a global attentional focus is initially primed, groups subsequently
put into a happy mood will generate more original ideas than will groups subsequently put into a
sad mood. By contrast, when a local attentional focus is initially primed, groups subsequently
put into a sad mood will generate more original ideas than groups subsequently put into a happy
mood.
Study 2 Method
Participants and Design
An a priori power analysis with G*Power was conducted to estimate the appropriate
sample size for Study 2, using the interaction effect size observed in the previous study by
Huntsinger & Ray (2016; Experiment 1). That analysis suggested that for power = .80 and α
= .05, a total sample size of 73 groups should be sufficient. However, because that effect size
was observed for individuals rather than groups, we slightly raised the sample size per cell.
Thus, 246 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology courses at Loyola University
Chicago were recruited for Study 2 and participated for course credits. They were formed into
three-person groups (N= 82), and groups were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (attentional
focus: global vs. local focus) x 2 (mood state: happy vs. sad) between-groups design.
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Creativity Task
In Study 2, groups performed a creative idea-generation task. Three-person groups were
given 15 min to generate ideas on how to improve their university. They were told that their job
as a group was to generate as many ideas as they could on the given topic. One of the group
members was randomly selected as a scribe who entered the ideas generated by the group into a
Microsoft word document using a desktop computer. Every new idea a member spoke was to be
added by the scribe into the word document file. Before starting idea-generation, the
experimenter emphasized four brainstorming rules that the group was to follow (Kohn et al.,
2011; Osborn, 1953). Specifically, group members were asked to refrain from making any
evaluative comments about the ideas (whether their own or others’) as they were being generated
(criticism is ruled out), to generate as many ideas as possible on a given topic (quantity is
desired), and focus on the task even when productivity is low (stay-focused on the task). They
were also told that any seemingly weird, radical, or creative ideas are welcomed (free-wheeling
is welcomed).
Procedure
The experimental procedure was identical to Study 1 with two exceptions. First, a
modified version of the Navon-letter-task (Huntsinger, 2012; Huntsinger & Ray, 2016) was used
to prime a global or a local focus (see below for details). Second, groups performed the group
brainstorming task. The basic procedure was as follows.
Three participants were invited to a laboratory room for each session and were seated in
separate cubicles. The experiment was introduced as two ostensibly separate studies – a
purported pilot study for another researcher and a “Group Brainstorming Study.” The pilot study
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includes two unrelated tasks presented as a “Letter recognition task” (cf. Navon, 1977) and the
“Life Events Inventory.” As described below, the two tasks were designed to manipulate global
vs. local attentional focus and happy vs. sad moods, respectively, and were presented on a desktop computer. At the outset of the study, participants were individually primed to engage in
either a global or local attentional focus and then performed the same Life Events Inventory task
as used in Study 1 for the mood induction. As soon as they completed these tasks, the three
participants were moved from their separate cubicles to a common table where they were to
perform the group brainstorming task, which they worked on for 15 minutes. After the group
completed the brainstorming task, the members were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.
Manipulation of Attentional Focus and Affective States
Prior to beginning the brainstorming task, participants completed the “pilot study”
allegedly containing the two unrelated tasks. The first of these was a variant of the Navon-lettertask (Navon, 1977) that has been used in previous research as an effective method of priming
either a global or local attentional focus (Huntsinger, 2012; Huntsinger et al., 2010; Huntsinger
& Ray, 2016). This letter recognition task requires participants to determine whether each of 80
figures contain an “L” or an “H.” Each figure consists of a large letter made up of small letters,
similar to what is shown in Figure 1. Participants viewed one of two sets of 80 figures, with one
used to prime a global attentional focus, and one to prime a local attentional focus. The set used
to prime a global attentional focus always consisted of either a large H or large L made up of
some other small letter (e.g., F, T), whereas the set used to prime a local attentional focus always
consisted of a large letter other than H or L (e.g., F, T) that was always made up of either small
Hs or small Ls. These figures were presented one at a time in random order on a computer
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screen. If the figure contained an H, participants had to press 1 on the keyboard. If the figure
contained an L, they had to press 0 on the keyboard (see Appendix M). By doing so,
participants’ attentional focus was directed globally (large letter) or locally (small letter),
respectively. For example, when a large F made up of small Ls was presented to participants,
they had to press 0 because the figure contained the small Ls. Thus, they were guided to develop
a local attentional focus. In contrast, when a large H made of small Fs was presented to
participants, they had to press 1 because the figure contained the large H. Therefore, they were
guided to develop a global attentional focus. Participants were to do this as quickly and
accurately as possible throughout the 80 rounds of the task.
Upon completion of the letter recognition task, the same Life Events Inventory task used
in Study 1 was presented to induce either a positive or negative mood state. As in Study 1,
participants were asked to recall and describe an event that made them feel either “really happy”
or “really sad,” and they did so while listening to a happy music (Mozart’s “Eine Kleine Nacht
Musik”) or a sad music (Mahler’s “Adagietto”). After they wrote individually about a happy or
sad memory for 8 min, participants were moved to the common table where they completed the
group brainstorming task.
Dependent Variables
Creative Fluency. One of the most frequently used measures of creativity performance
in brainstorming tasks is the sheer number of non-redundant ideas generated by each group
(hereafter called, fluency). In general, it is expected that the more ideas a group produces, the
more it is likely that they are able to arrive at an original (novel and infrequent) outcome (i.e.,
quantity breeds quality; Diehl & Stroebe, 1987, Simonton, 1999). To assess fluency, I examined
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the list of ideas produced by each group and ascertained for the number of non-repetitive ideas
generated. I did this in such a way that I was (temporarily) blind to the experimental conditions.
Flexibility. Another quantitative measure of brainstorming performance is the number of
unique idea categories (hereafter called, flexibility). As discussed above, idea categories can be
represented as an associative semantic network consisting of inter-connected cognitive nodes
(e.g., Anderson, 2013; Brown et al., 1998; Collins & Loftus, 1975). For example, when
generating ideas on a given topic, the ideas “desk” and “table” can be conceptualized as being
within the same category (e.g., furniture). In contrast, the ideas “desk” and “airplane” seem to be
from different categories (e.g., furniture and transportation, respectively). The ability to shift
flexibly from one category to another is necessary in order to be able to generate ideas in many
different idea categories. Such flexibility is considered to be a critical determinant of creativity
(Guilford, 1967), since the more categories considered, the more varied will be the ideas
generated, which in turn should lead to more original idea combinations (e.g., Bass et al., 2008;
Kohn & Smith, 2011; Nijstad et al., 2010).
Flexibility was evaluated by a pair of trained research assistants who were blind to the
hypotheses and experimental conditions. They each analyzed approximately two-thirds of the
ideas, with one-third (26 groups, 749 of 2,642 ideas) evaluated by both coders. The twice-coded
groups were used to assess inter-coder reliability. Each assistant classified every idea generated
by a group into one of 23 mutually exclusive categories. The categories were based on prior
research with this topic (e.g., Baruah & Paulus, 2011; Goldenberg et al., 2013; Kohn et al., 2011;
Putman & Paulus, 2009). The specific definition of each category was developed by the author
under the supervision of Dr. Larson (cf. Goldenberg et al., 2013). Among the categories were

52
food, dorms and housing, maintenance, commuting, financing, library, athletics, and safety (see
Appendix N for a complete list and examples). The two coders were trained using a detailed
definition of each category. I assessed inter-rater reliability by computing Cohen’s kappa, which
is an agreement between two coders with regard to categorization decisions (e.g., categorize an
idea into the same category or not). Agreement between the two coders was high (Cohen’s
kappa = .88). Flexibility was defined simply the total number of unique idea categories sampled
by each group.
Idea Originality. As a qualitative measure of group creativity, I obtained a consensual
measure of originality at the idea level via observer ratings. A separate pair of research
assistants independently rated each idea for originality, which was defined as “an idea that is
infrequent, novel, unusual, and original,” using a 5-point scale (1 = ‘Least Original’, 5 = ‘Very
Original’). An original idea was operationalized as one that went beyond a simple improvement
or revision of something that already existed in the university (see Appendix O). To increase the
coder’s shared understanding of originality, I gave them a detailed description for each point of
the rating scale, and included for each several example ideas. For example, the ideas “a new
dining hall,” “fix broken elevators,” and “more sports teams” were regarded least original, while
the ideas “Zip line between buildings,” “build underground tunnels,” and “fair wages for
employees at Loyola” were regarded original.
The coders were senior-level undergraduate students who had direct, up-to-date
experience at Loyola University Chicago and therefore were knowledgeable about the topic of
the brainstorming task. So, I believe those raters were qualified to code the creativity of the
generated ideas. A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed to assess inter-rater reliability,
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which was excellent (r = .92). I averaged the originality ratings across all of the ideas generated
by a group in order to control for differences in fluency between groups.
Study 2 Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Study 2). Independent variables were
coded as 1 = global focus and happy mood, -1 = local focus and sad mood. Note. * = p < .05, **
= p < .01.
Variables
1. Cognitive Processing Style
2. Affective States
3. Fluency
4. Flexibility
5. Average Originality of Ideas

M
.02
.00
32.23
12.23
1.23

SD
1.00
1.00
11.68
2.52
.18

1
.00
-.01
-.11
-.02

2

3

4

5

.13
.02
-.02

.63**
.16

.24*

-

Table 5. Fluency, Flexibility, and the Average Originality of Ideas (Study 2).
Global attentional focus
Happy mood
(n = 21)
Dependent
variables

Sad mood
(n = 21)

Local attentional focus
Happy mood
(n = 20)

Sad mood
(n = 21)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Creative Fluency

37.33 (10.94)

26.86 (11.11)

30.00 (11.08)

34.65 (11.45)

Flexibility

12.81 (2.27)

11.09 (2.23)

11.70 (2.68)

13.35 (2.43)

1.29 (.21)

1.17 (.12)

1.17 (.11)

1.31 (.21)

Average Originality
of Ideas

M (SD)

Creative Fluency. Hypothesis 4 predicted that when group members were initially
primed to engage in a global attentional focus, subsequently inducing a positive mood would
produce greater fluency than would inducing a negative mood, but when members were initially
primed to engage in a local attentional focus, the pattern would reverse. To test this prediction, I
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performed a 2 (attentional focus) x 2 (affect) analysis of variance (ANOVA). That analysis
revealed a statistically significant interaction effect on the sheer number of ideas generated; F (1,
78) = 9.44, p = .003, ηp2 = .108. As can be seen in Table 5, when a global attentional focus was
initially primed, groups generated more ideas in the happy mood condition (M = 37.33, SD =
10.94) than in the sad mood condition (M = 26.86, SD = 11.11); F (1, 78) = 9.28, p = .003. On
the other hand, when a local attentional focus was initially primed, groups tended to produce
more ideas in the sad mood condition (M = 34.65, SD = 11.45) than in the happy mood condition
(M = 30.00, SD = 11.08). However, this latter difference did not reach a conventional level of
statistical significance, F (1, 78) = 1.74, p = .191. Thus, while a significant interaction was
observed, it seemed due more to the effect of the mood manipulation when a global attentional
focus was initially primed than when a local focus was initially primed. So, Hypothesis 4 was
only partially supported. Neither main effect was significant; ps > .24 for both.
Flexibility. Hypothesis 5 predicted that when group members were initially primed to
engage in a global attentional focus, subsequently inducing a positive mood would produce
greater flexibility than would inducing a negative mood, but when members were initially
primed to engage in a local attentional focus, the opposite pattern would emerge. In support of
this, a two-way ANOVA using the number of idea categories sampled as the dependent variable
revealed a significant interaction between attentional focus and affect; F (1, 78) = 10.01, p
= .002, ηp2 = .114. Simple effect analyses revealed that when a global attentional focus was
initially primed, flexibility was higher in the happy mood condition (M = 12.81, SD = 2.27) than
in the sad mood condition (M = 11.09, SD = 2.23); F (1, 78) = 5.33, p = .024. On the other hand,
when a local attentional focus was initially primed, flexibility was higher in the sad mood
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condition (M = 13.35, SD = 2.43) than in the happy mood condition (M = 11.70, SD = 2.68); F
(1, 78) = 4.70, p = .033. Thus, the Hypothesis 5 was fully supported.
Originality of Ideas. Hypothesis 6 predicted that when group members were initially
primed to engage in a global attentional focus, subsequently inducing a positive mood would
results in groups producing more original ideas than would inducing a negative mood, but when
members were initially primed to engage in a local attentional focus, the pattern would reverse.
For the average idea originality ratings, I found a significant interaction effect; F (1, 78) = 12.04,
p = .001, ηp2 = .134. Simple effect analyses revealed that when a global attentional focus was
initially primed, rated originality was higher in the happy mood condition (M = 1.29, SD = .21)
than in the sad mood condition (M = 1.17, SD = .12); F (1, 78) = 5.33, p = .023. On the other
hand, when a local attentional focus was initially primed, rated originality was higher in the sad
mood condition (M = 1.31, SD = .21) than in the happy mood condition (M = 1.17, SD = .11); F
(1, 78) = 6.70, p = .011. Thus, the Hypothesis 6 was fully supported.
Study 2 Discussion
The key objective of Study 2 was to further explore the flexible impact of affective states
on the performance of small groups, focusing on a different cognitive processing dimension and
on a different task domain. Participants were grouped into triads, and their attentional focus
(global or local) and mood state (happy or sad) were manipulated (in that order). Then, groups
performed a creative idea generation task. Study 2 found that when a global focus was initially
primed, groups subsequently put in a happy mood had greater fluency and flexibility, and
generated more original ideas, than those put in a sad mood. But when a local focus was initially
primed, this pattern was reversed. These results suggest that either high or low group creativity
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can be achieved when members are put into either a happy or sad mood, depending on the
cognitive style in use by members at the moment the affective state is induced.
Unlike flexibility and originality, however, one of the simple effects on fluency was not
statistically significant. Even so, the direction of the means was as predicted. It should be noted
here that although both fluency and flexibility reflect the quantitative aspect of ideational
creativity, a global and local attentional focus may have different implications for them. A local
attentional focus results in a narrowing of attention to a few relatively closely related categories
(Förster & Dannenberg, 2010). But this does not automatically imply less fluency, as groups
with a local attentional focus might still be able to generate many ideas from within just a few
categories (Nijstad et al., 2010; Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). But flexibility captures the ability to
switch between distantly related categories, and is presumed to be facilitated by a global
attentional focus. As described earlier, a global attentional focus leads to spreading activation to
semantically remote categories, which in turn leads to relatively frequent switching among them
(Förster & Dannenberg, 2010). Thus, compared to fluency, flexibility might be a more sensitive
measure for the effect of a global attentional focus on ideational creativity.
Also, consistent with previous research (e.g., Bass et al., 2008; Nijstad et al., 2010),
flexibility was positive correlated with fluency (r = .63, p < .01) and originality (r = .24, p < .05).
But unexpectedly, fluency was not correlated with originality (r = .16, p = .15). This result
might be due in part to the fact that Study 2 adopting Osborn’s brainstorming rules, which
emphasize quantity rather than quality (e.g., the more ideas the better; Osborn, 1953).
Consequently, a considerable number of the ideas that groups generated were rated not original.
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Indeed, 85% (2,256) of the total set of ideas (2,642) were given a rating of “1” by the coders,
which represents the lowest level of original.

CHAPTER FOUR
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this dissertation was to test whether the affective states shared
among members have a flexible or fixed influence on group effectiveness. The positive and
negative affect (e.g., happiness, sadness) that people momentarily experience has long been
assumed to influence how they think and behave (e.g., Forgas, 2006; George & Dane, 2016).
Indeed, a substantial amount of research has demonstrated the impact of affective feelings on the
thinking and behavior of individuals (Huntsinger et al., 2014; Schwartz, 2012). However,
although many complex and important tasks are left to groups, relatively less attention has been
paid to how such feelings might influence group performance, and only a handful of studies have
examined specifically how affect influences group decision-making (e.g., Bramesfeld & Gasper,
2008, Emich, 2014; Van Knippenberg et al., 2010) and creativity (e.g., Grawitch et al. 2003a,
2003b). The present research thus examines a significant but understudied problem in group and
organizational psychology.
Additionally, most past research on the relationship between member affect and group
performance appears to have been conducted under the implicit assumption of a fixed link
between affect and cognition (e.g., the affect-as-information model; Schwarz, 2012). No
research to date has directly examined the flexible link, affect-as-cognitive-feedback model
(Huntsinger et al., 2014) in task-performing groups. The goal of the current research was to fill
this void. Drawing on the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model, I hypothesized in Study 1 that
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the influence of happy and sad moods on group decision-making effectiveness would depend on
the cognitive processing style—heuristic vs. systematic—in which group members were engaged
just before either mood was aroused. In Study 2, I predicted that the impact of happy and sad
moods on group creativity would depend on the relative dominance of members’ global vs. local
attentional focus just prior to the affect’s arousal. The results from the two experiments provided
support for these hypotheses. Study 1 found that when systematic processing was initially
primed, subsequently inducing positive affect prompted greater discussion of critical, uniquelyheld information, and ultimately more accurate decision making, than did inducing negative
affect, whereas the pattern reversed when heuristic processing was initially primed. In addition,
Study 2 found that when a global attentional focus was initially primed, subsequently inducing
positive affect prompted greater fluency, flexibility, and originality of ideas generated by groups
than did inducing negative affect, whereas the reverse occurred when a local attentional focus
was initially primed. These results are in line with the patterns predicted by the affect-ascognitive-feedback model (Huntsinger et al., 2014). They also extend Huntsinger and Ray’s
(2016) study by showing that the flexible link between affect and cognition exists in groups in
the same way that it seems to exist in individuals. My research is an initial step toward a
systematic examination of the flexible impact of member affect on group processes and
performance.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
I have demonstrated that the affect-as-cognitive-feedback model can be usefully applied
at the group-level of analysis. While prior research with this model has focused exclusively on
intra-individual processes (e.g., Huntsinger et al., 2014; Huntsinger & Ray, 2016), the current
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dissertation suggests that it can be used as well as a framework for understanding the role of
affect and cognition in intra-group processes. The link between affect and cognition was found
to be more flexible than previously thought, both when group members collaboratively perform
analytic tasks and creative tasks. The current research sheds some light on how the interplay of
affect and cognition can shape group information processing and performance.
A useful direction for future research would be to further examine the flexible impact of
affective states in other areas of group intellective performance, such as collective memory and
creative problem solving. For example, if group members attend to and encode information into
memory more thoroughly, they may later recall that information more accurately. In this regard,
people performing a memory encoding task should benefit more from a detail-oriented,
systematic processing style rather than a shallow, heuristic processing style. Consistent with this
idea, Storbeck and Clore (2005) found that a positive mood prompted more memory errors in a
recall task than did neutral and negative moods, because the former inhibited an item-specific,
systematic processing style at encoding rather than at retrieval. This result was originally
interpreted as support for the fixed-link, affect-as-information model, which suggests that people
in a happy mood commit more recall errors because they are engaged in shallow, heuristic
processing, whereas people in a sad mood commit fewer recall errors because they are engaged
in more thorough, systematic processing (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007). But their study did not
experimentally control participants’ cognitive processing style before inducing a mood state.
Given that heuristic processing is often the default processing style at the outset of a laboratory
experiment (Huntsinger et al., 2014), it seems reasonable to conjecture that in their study positive
affect encouraged participants to continue their heuristic processing, while negative affect led
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them to switch from heuristic to systematic processing. Thus, how affective states influence the
recall performance of individuals—and of group—may depend on whether a heuristic or
systematic processing style is at play just before the mood is induced. Testing the affect-ascognitive-feedback model in other group tasks requiring a particular processing style will
provide more comprehensive evidence for the flexible link between affect and cognition,
allowing a deeper understanding of the role of member affect in groups.
One practical implication of the two studies reported here is that it may not be easy for
organizations to leverage affect as a means of promoting group effectiveness, as both positive
and negative affect appear capable of either improving or impairing group performance on
complex decision-making and creativity tasks, depending on the circumstances under which they
are aroused. Simply put, my research indicates that “one-size-fits-all” recommendations (e.g., to
always promote either positive or negative affect in task-performing groups) are unlikely to be
effective. This is important because researchers and organizations tend to prematurely conclude
that positive affect, relative to negative affect, is always good for task performance and
psychological health (e.g., Bramesfeld, & Gasper, 2008; Fredrickson, 2001). Leaders and
decision-makers in organizations should be further advised to carefully consider the nature of
group task (analytic vs. creative task), and the flexible link between affect and cognition. Team
effectiveness and management decisions might benefit from taking these into consideration.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although the current studies provide novel insights into the relationship between affect
and cognition in groups, several limitations should be mentioned. First, the studies reported here
focus exclusively on transitory affective states, and say nothing about how long the observed
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interaction between initial processing style and subsequently aroused affect is likely to persist.
Relatedly, I have ignored chronic, affect-related dispositional tendencies, such as the proclivity
to experience positive and/or negative affect (cf., Watson & Clark, 1984). However, several
studies have shown that stable dispositions of this sort can influence group decision-making
quality (e.g., Kooij‐de Bode et al., 2010; Van Knippenberg et al., 2010). Furthermore, Van
Knippenberg et al. (2010) found that group members’ dispositional negative affectivity and
transitory affective states can interactively influence group decision quality. Specifically,
inducing a negative mood led to more accurate decisions than did inducing a positive mood
when group members were low in negative affectivity, but not when they were high in negative
affectivity. An important direction for future research is to better understand the impact of such
stable dispositional tendencies, and how they might interact with situationally determined affect
and cognitive processing styles. Whether affect-related dispositional tendencies can be
accommodated within the affect-as-cognitive-feedback theoretical framework is an open
question that deserves attention.
Second, I considered only the effects of happy and sad mood states. Real groups, of
course, can experience many emotions other than happiness and sadness while performing a task.
According to the affect-as-cognitive-feedback perspective, some of these other affective states
can, like happiness and sadness, signal the appropriateness of either maintaining or changing
one’s current cognitive processing style. For example, anger and anxiety both are negative in
tone (valence), but the former is an activating negative emotion with high levels of arousal,
whereas the latter is a deactivating negative emotion with low levels of arousal. Activating
affective states (e.g., anger, happiness) are predicted to reinforce the use of one’s current
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processing style whereas deactivating affective states (e.g., anxiety, sadness) are predicted to
trigger a change in style (Huntsinger et al., 2014; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Consistent with
this idea, research on advice-taking and belief revision among individuals has shown that,
compared to being in a neutral mood, anxiety promotes more openness, and does anger less
openness, to taking advice from others (Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012; Gino & Schweitzer,
2008). Although participants’ cognitive processing style prior to the mood manipulation was not
experimentally controlled in these studies, given that heuristic processing is often the default
orientation (Fiske & Taylor, 2008), it seems reasonable to speculate that in these studies the
introduction of anxiety caused participants to switch from heuristic to systematic processing,
while anger encouraged them to hold fast to heuristic processing. This is because systematic
processing implies taking account of more information, including advice, while heuristic
processing implies taking account of less information, and so a greater likelihood of ignoring
advice. Testing the effects of these other affective states in group judgment and decision-making
contexts, especially when group members’ initial cognitive processing style can be
experimentally controlled, would provide a more comprehensive test of the affect-as-cognitivefeedback model, and would greatly expand our understanding of the role that affect plays in
groups.
Third, we exposed the members of each group to exactly the same affect manipulation at
exactly the same time. Such homogeneity of affect no doubt does sometimes occur in real-world
groups. More often, however, it is likely that just one or two members may experience
discernable positive or negative affect in a given situation (e.g., as a carry-over from a separate
incident that occurred just before the group convened). There is some evidence that moods and
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emotions are “contagious”—they can be transmitted from one member to a member without
conscious awareness (Hatfield et al., 1993; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Pugh, 2001; Sy et al.,
2005; Van Knippenberg et al., 2013). And as previously described, Emich (2014) found that
groups with just one member in either a positive or negative mood can have a discernable impact
of the quality of a groups’ collective decision making. But there is much more to be learned
here, including whether initially having just one member in either a positive or negative affective
state is enough to prompt the group as a whole to either maintain or change its current cognitive
processing style. Addressing such questions is thus another useful direction for future research.
Finally, regarding the timing of affect arousal, it should be noted that group members’
cognitive processing style and affective state were manipulated just prior to a relatively brief
group interaction (10 minutes in Study 1, 15 in Study 2). It remains to be seen how the interplay
of affect and cognition operates during longer group interactions. Previous research has shown
that working in a group can sustain members’ positive affect but may diminish their negative
affect over time (e.g., Park & Hinsz, 2015). In other words, group interaction itself seems
capable of altering members’ affective states. However, if positive affect persists and negative
affect fades during group interaction, that interaction should tend not to change whatever style is
operating after the initial induction (because the signal to change—negative affect—tends to
fade). In other words, there is at least some reason to believe the interaction effects observed in
the present studies might persist for more than 10–15 minutes. Exploring empirically the
duration of these effects is an issue worth exploring.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, I propose that the Huntsinger et al. (2014) affect-as-cognitive-feedback
account offers useful insights into the role of affect in group intellective performance.
Understanding how group members’ affect influences their cognitive processing style is
important because their cognitive processing style can significantly impact their collective
performance. The literature on the role of member affect in groups is filled with studies that
presume a fixed-link between affect and cognition. Taking a new theoretical approach, my
research demonstrates the benefits of considering the possibility of a flexible link between affect
and cognition in groups. I hope that it stimulates further research in this area.
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Project Title: Group Investment Study
Researchers: Young-Jae, Yoon, MA, and James R. Larson, Jr., Ph.D.
Introduction: You are being asked to take part in a research study that is being conducted by Dr. James
R. Larson, Jr. who is a faculty member in the Department of Psychology at Loyola University Chicago.
You are eligible to participate in this study because you are enrolled in either Psychology 100 or
Psychology 101 and are at least 18 years of age.
Please read this document carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding whether or not
to participate in the study.
Purpose: You are invited to participate in this research project on group decision-making. Its purpose is
to learn more about the processes underlying group investment decisions.
Procedures: You will be asked to review some information about several financial investment options,
and then decide as a group what is most likely to become commercially successful. The investment
options all concern (hypothetical) pharmaceutical companies that are developing new drugs.
You will be asked to discuss the investment decision with the other participants. Also, your discussion
may be video-recorded. If your discussion is recorded, you will be asked at the end of the session for
your verbal permission to save that recording. If you agree, it will be saved and used for research
purposes only. But if you feel at all uncomfortable about having been video-recorded, you may ask the
experimenter to delete the video, and it will be deleted immediately.
As part of this experiment, you will be asked to take part in a separate pilot test for another researcher. It
consists of a simple word puzzle task and describing a life event memory. The pilot task will take about
10 min. The session as a whole will take no longer than one hour to complete.
Compensation: You will receive two research credits for the study that count toward the fulfillment of
the research participation component of your introductory psychology course.
Risks and Benefits: There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those
experienced in everyday life. There are no direct benefits associated with participating in this research
other than learning about how psychological research is conducted.
Confidentiality: All of the data obtained in this study are confidential and will be used for research
purposes only. No individually identifying information will be stored with the data, and only aggregate
findings will be described in written or oral reports of this research.
Paper forms and questionnaires used in this research will be stored in secure cabinets, and will be
destroyed as soon as the data contained on them have been transferred to electronic data files. Any video
recordings that might be made as part of this research will also be stored in secure cabinets, and will be
destroyed as soon as the data they contain have been coded and entered into electronic data files. All
electronic data files will be stored in a secure location for an indefinite period of time for archival
purposes. Again, these data files will contain no individually identifying information.
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If a video recording is made of today's session, then at the end of the session you will be asked to give
your permission to use that recording as part of the research. If you give your permission, we will, within
one year, code and transcribe the recording, then destroy it. However, if at the end of today's session you
prefer for any reason that we not use the recording, you may say so, and we will destroy it immediately
without making any use of it whatsoever.

Voluntary Participation: Your participation is voluntary. You may withhold any information that you
do not wish to disclose, and you do not have to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer.
You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time without loss of class credit or risk of penalty.

Contacts and Questions: If you have questions about this study, you may contact Dr. Jim Larson at
jlarson4@luc.edu or (773) 508-3192 or Mr. Young-Jae Yoon at yyoon1@luc.edu. If you have questions
about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Loyola University Office of Research
Services at (773) 508-2689.

Statement of Consent to Participation:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information provided above, have had an
opportunity to ask questions, and agree to participate in this research study.

_____________________________
Full name of Participant (please print)

______________________________
Date

___________________________________
Signature of Participant

______________________________
Signature of Researcher

Statement of Consent to Use Video Recording:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information provided above, have had an
opportunity to ask questions about it, and agree to allow the video recording made of your group
discussion to be coded and/or transcribed, after which it will be destroyed.
_____________________________
Signature of Participant

______________________________
Date

_____________________________
Signature of Researcher

______________________________
Date
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Group Investment Study

1. Investment options:
Pharmaceutical company

Developing Cholesterol-lowering Drug

Bluestone Pharmaceuticals

Chol-BLUE

Green Tree Pharmaceuticals

Chol-GREEN

2. Read the colored-booklets about the two cholesterol-lowering drugs carefully. Make sure
you understand all of the information it contains. Try to remember as many of the details of
this information as you can. Your ability to remember this information will be important
later. You will be asked to discuss this information with other members. If so, you will not
be able to refer back to the written material during discussion. It all must come from
memory.

3. Decide whether the information contained in each packet is positive or negative for that drug.
 Positive information indicates that the drug is effective, safe to use, inexpensive to
manufacture, or likely be in high demand by consumers. The more positive
information there is about a drug, the greater the likelihood that the drug will
become commercially successful.
 Negative information indicates that the drug is ineffective, dangerous to use,
expensive to manufacture, or likely not to be in demand by consumers. The more
negative information there is about a drug, the lower the likelihood that the drug
will become commercially successful.

4. Based on your evaluation of all this information, you will decide individually and
collaboratively which of the two drugs has the highest potential for becoming commercially
successful.
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Cholesterol Background Information

 Heart disease is the single largest cause of death in the United States. Although many factors
contribute to raising a person’s risk of heart disease, a high level of LDL cholesterol in the
blood is a major cause of atherosclerosis that is a major cause of heart disease.

 For many years, scientists have known that there is a strong relationship between heart
disease and high blood LDL cholesterol levels.

 There are two different types of cholesterol: low-density lipoproteins (LDL) and highdensity lipoproteins (HDL). Most cholesterol about 80% -- is carried by LDL. Interestingly,
unlike LDL, researchers have found that as the amount of HDL increases, the risk of heart
attack actually decreases.

 To help lower cholesterol, researchers have tried to develop drugs that block the production
of cholesterol in the liver. Of course, the liver is a very important organ, and should not be
tampered with haphazardly. Therefore, before any cholesterol-lowering drug is used, great
care must be taken to ensure that the drug does not have any negative effects on the liver, or
on any other part of the body.

 Another approach to lowering cholesterol is to develop drugs that help the body excrete
cholesterol. Excretion is possible as long as the cholesterol continues to circulate in the
blood, instead of sticking to and building up on the lining of the arteries. Some research
indicates that HDL may play a role in helping to prevent cholesterol from building up on
artery walls. Therefore, drugs that increase HDL may also serve to reduce overall blood
cholesterol levels.
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Chol-BLUE Item Set
- Member 1 -

 Chol-BLUE reduced the likelihood of secondary strokes.
 A market survey suggested that there is likely to be a strong
consumer demand for Chol-BLUE. [Unshared]
 Chol-BLUE is absorbed completely and fast in animals. This is
likely to be equally the case in humans. [Unshared]
 Chol-BLUE may not be effective for some patients when used
over a long period of time.
 MRI studies revealed that patients treated with Chol-BLUE may
be susceptible to liver damage.
 Chol-BLUE caused hidden reproductive problems in mice that
appeared only in subsequent generations. It is unknown if this will
occur in humans.
 Chol-BLUE interferes with the body’s natural weight control
mechanisms and hinders efforts toward weight loss in some
overweight patients. Weight loss is an important component of
heart disease treatment.
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Chol-GREEN Item Set
- Member 1 -

 Chol-GREEN can be delivered in an effective way that some
patients may find especially convenient.
 Both tablet and liquid forms of Chol-GREEN were effective in
reducing LDL (bad) cholesterol in children.
 Chol-GREEN helps decrease LDL (bad) cholesterol in the
majority of elderly patients.
 Chol-GREEN worked effectively in adult women through early
middle-age, with no evidence of child-bearing complications.
 Chol-GREEN received a scientific award for excellence. This is a
marketing advantage because physicians generally favor drugs that
receive this type of scientific recognition.
 Chol-GREEN caused diarrhea and vomiting in some elderly
patients. Unpleasant gastrointestinal side effects like these may
discourage some patients from taking this drug. [Unshared]
 Chol-GREEN may have an adverse impact on skeletal muscle
tissues, especially among younger patients. [Unshared]
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Chol-BLUE Item Set
- Member 2 -

 Chol-BLUE reduced the likelihood of secondary strokes.
 Chol-BLUE may be beneficial to human patients as a postoperative treatment following many types of surgical procedures.
[Unshared]
 The American Heart Association would likely endorse CholBLUE. This will foster consumer confidence and improve sales.
[Unshared]
 Chol-BLUE may not be effective for some patients when used
over a long period of time.
 MRI studies revealed that patients treated with Chol-BLUE may
be susceptible to liver damage.
 Chol-BLUE caused hidden reproductive problems in mice that
appeared only in subsequent generations. It is unknown if this will
occur in humans.
 Chol-BLUE interferes with the body’s natural weight control
mechanisms and hinders efforts toward weight loss in some
overweight patients. Weight loss is an important component of
heart disease treatment.
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Chol-GREEN Item Set
- Member 2 -

 Chol-GREEN can be delivered in an effective way that some
patients may find especially convenient.
 Both tablet and liquid forms of Chol-GREEN were effective in
reducing LDL (bad) cholesterol in children.
 Chol-GREEN helps decrease LDL (bad) cholesterol in the
majority of elderly patients.
 Chol-GREEN worked effectively in adult women through early
middle-age, with no evidence of child-bearing complications.
 Chol-GREEN received a scientific award for excellence. This is a
marketing advantage because physicians generally favor drugs that
receive this type of scientific recognition.
 Hamsters treated with Chol-GREEN had an unusually high
likelihood of developing gallstones. Humans may also be at risk
for this complication. [Unshared]
 Chol-GREEN production process creates a dangerous gas. This
problem needs to be solved before launching the product. Such a
delay would give competitors and advantage, and might ultimately
hurt the profitability of Chol-GREEN. [Unshared]
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Chol-BLUE Item Set
- Member 3 -

 Chol-BLUE reduced the likelihood of secondary strokes.
 Chol-BLUE reduced the death rate of patients diagnosed with
cardiovascular disease (CV). [Unshared]
 Chol-BLUE was effective for males in their teens and early adult
years. [Unshared]
 Chol-BLUE may not be effective for some patients when used
over a long period of time.
 MRI studies revealed that patients treated with Chol-BLUE may
be susceptible to liver damage.
 Chol-BLUE caused hidden reproductive problems in mice that
appeared only in subsequent generations. It is unknown if this will
occur in humans.
 Chol-BLUE interferes with the body’s natural weight control
mechanisms and hinders efforts toward weight loss in some
overweight patients. Weight loss is an important component of
heart disease treatment.
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Chol-GREEN Item Set
- Member 3 -

 Chol-GREEN can be delivered in an effective way that some
patients may find especially convenient.
 Both tablet and liquid forms of Chol-GREEN were effective in
reducing LDL (bad) cholesterol in children.
 Chol-GREEN helps decrease LDL (bad) cholesterol in the
majority of elderly patients.
 Chol-GREEN worked effectively in adult women through early
middle-age, with no evidence of child-bearing complications.
 Chol-GREEN received a scientific award for excellence. This is a
marketing advantage because physicians generally favor drugs that
receive this type of scientific recognition.
 Chol-GREEN reduced white blood cell counts below normal
levels. Because white blood cells are important for fighting
infection, there is a danger that treatment with Chol-GREEN could
make patients more susceptible to a wide range of infectious
diseases. [Unshared]
 Chol-GREEN may produce internal tissue damage and collateral
bleeding in some male patients. [Unshared]
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Chol-BLUE Item Set
Please write below the Key Phrase (the under-lined sentence) for Chol-BLUE. Place the Key Phrase that
you judge to be POSITIVE about the drug at the TOP of the page, and the Key Phrase that you judge to
be NEGATIVE about the drug at the BOTTOM.
POSTIVE INFORMATION DOCUMENTS
No

KEY PHRASE

NEGATIVE INFORMATION DOCUMENTS
No

KEY PHRASE
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Chol-GREEN Item Set
Please write below the Key Phrase (the under-lined sentence) for Chol-GREEN. Place the Key Phrase
that you judge to be POSITIVE about the drug at the TOP of the page, and the Key Phrase that you
judge to be NEGATIVE about the drug at the BOTTOM.
POSTIVE INFORMATION DOCUMENTS
No

KEY PHRASE

NEGATIVE INFORMATION DOCUMENTS
No

KEY PHRASE
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Individual Decision Form

1. Given the information provided above, which drug do you think the highest potential for
becoming a commercially viable product? (circle only one)
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

2. Please briefly explain the logic behind your decision in a sentence or two.
_______________________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________

_______________________________________________________________________

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE OVER WHEN YOU ARE DONE.
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 Sample items to prime Heuristic processing

 Sample items to prime Systematic processing
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 Happy moods condition.

 Sad moods condition.
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Final Decision Form
Given the entire information provided, please decide as a Group what drug is MOST likely
to become commercially successful. Again, just one of these drugs is likely to be a good
long-term investment.

Please indicate your answer by circling one drug on the table below.

Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

APPENDIX J
STUDY 1 SURPRISE RECALL TEST QUESTIONNAIRE

92

93

Please read the following instructions carefully!
1. On the following pages are listed all of the original 22 statements of drug information that you
read during the study period, but with the name of drug obscured (i.e., Chol-BLUE -> this drug).
Please re-read each statement. Then, please identify the drug to which each statement refers.
1. This drug helps decrease LDL (bad) cholesterol in the majority of elderly patients.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

2. This drug worked effectively in adult women through early middle-age, with no evidence of childbearing complications.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

3. This drug may have an adverse impact on skeletal muscle tissues, especially among younger patients.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

4. A market survey suggested that there is likely to be a strong consumer demand for this drug.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

5. Hamsters treated with this drug had an unusually high likelihood of developing gallstones. Humans
may also be at risk for this complication.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

6. MRI studies revealed that patients treated with this drug may be susceptible to liver damage.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN
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7. This drug can be delivered in an effective way that some patients may find especially convenient.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

8. This drug was effective for males in their teens and early adult years.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

9. This drug may produce internal tissue damage and collateral bleeding in some male patients
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

10. This drug caused diarrhea and vomiting in some elderly patients. Unpleasant gastrointestinal side
effects like these may discourage some patients from taking this drug.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

11. This drug interferes with the body’s natural weight control mechanisms and hinders efforts toward
weight loss in some overweight patients. Weight loss is an important component of heart disease treatment.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

12. The American Heart Association would likely endorse this drug. This will foster consumer confidence
and improve sales.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN
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13. This drug reduced white blood cell counts below normal levels. Because white blood cells are
important for fighting infection, there is a danger that treatment with this drug could make patients more
susceptible to a wide range of infectious diseases.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

14. This drug reduced the likelihood of secondary strokes.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

15. Both tablet and liquid forms of this drug were effective in reducing LDL (bad) cholesterol in children.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

16. This drug production process creates a dangerous gas. This problem needs to be solved before
launching the product. Such a delay would give competitors and advantage, and might ultimately hurt the
profitability of this drug.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

17. This drug may be beneficial to human patients as a post-operative treatment following many types of
surgical procedures.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN
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18. This drug caused hidden reproductive problems in mice that appeared only in subsequent generations.
It is unknown if this will occur in humans.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

19. This drug is absorbed completely and fast in animals. This is likely to be equally the case in humans.
Physicians who prescribe cholesterol-reducing drugs will find these characteristics very desirable.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

20. This drug reduced the death rate of patients diagnosed with cardiovascular disease (CV).
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

21. This drug may not be effective for some patients when used over a long period of time.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN

22. This drug received a scientific award for excellence. This is a marketing advantage because physicians
generally favor drugs that receive this type of scientific recognition.
This statement refers to…
Chol-BLUE

Chol-GREEN
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Project Title: Group Brainstorming Study
Researchers: Young-Jae, Yoon, MA, and James R. Larson, Jr., Ph.D.
Introduction: You are being asked to take part in a research study that is being conducted by Dr. James
R. Larson, Jr. who is a faculty member in the Department of Psychology at Loyola University Chicago.
You are eligible to participate in this study because you are enrolled in either Psychology 100 or
Psychology 101 and are at least 18 years of age.
Please read this document carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding whether or not
to participate in the study.
Purpose: You are invited to participate in this research project on group brainstorming. Its purpose is to
learn more about the idea generation processes of groups.
Procedures: You are going to brainstorm in a group of three people. Specifically, you will be asked to
invent as a group as many ideas as possible on a given topic.
Your group discussion may be video-recorded. If your discussion is recorded, you will be asked at the
end of the session for your verbal permission to save that recording. If you agree, it will be saved and
used for research purposes only. But if you feel at all uncomfortable about having been video-recorded,
you may ask the experimenter to delete the video, and it will be deleted immediately.
As part of this experiment, you will be asked to take part in a separate pilot test for another researcher
prior to the group brainstorming session. It consists of a simple word puzzle task and describing a life
event memory. The pilot task will take about 10 min. The session as a whole will take no longer than
one hour to complete.
Compensation: You will receive two research credits for the study that count toward the fulfillment of
the research participation component of your introductory psychology course.
Risks and Benefits: There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those
experienced in everyday life. There are no direct benefits associated with participating in this research
other than learning about how psychological research is conducted.
Confidentiality: All of the data obtained in this study are confidential and will be used for research
purposes only. No individually identifying information will be stored with the data, and only aggregate
findings will be described in written or oral reports of this research.
Paper forms and questionnaires used in this research will be stored in secure cabinets, and will be
destroyed as soon as the data contained on them have been transferred to electronic data files. Any video
recordings that might be made as part of this research will also be stored in secure cabinets, and will be
destroyed as soon as the data they contain have been coded and entered into electronic data files. All
electronic data files will be stored in a secure location for an indefinite period of time for archival
purposes. Again, these data files will contain no individually identifying information.
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If a video recording is made of today's session, then at the end of the session you will be asked to give
your permission to use that recording as part of the research. If you give your permission, we will, within
one year, code and transcribe the recording, then destroy it. However, if at the end of today's session you
prefer for any reason that we not use the recording, you may say so, and we will destroy it immediately
without making any use of it whatsoever.
Voluntary Participation: Your participation is voluntary. You may withhold any information that you
do not wish to disclose, and you do not have to answer any questions that you do not wish to answer.
You have the right to withdraw from this study at any time without loss of class credit or risk of penalty.
Contacts and Questions: If you have questions about this study, you may contact Dr. Jim Larson at
jlarson4@luc.edu or (773) 508-3192 or Mr. Young-Jae Yoon at yyoon1@luc.edu. If you have questions
about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Loyola University Office of Research
Services at (773) 508-2689.

Statement of Consent to Participation:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information provided above, have had an
opportunity to ask questions, and agree to participate in this research study.

_____________________________
Full name of Participant (please print)

______________________________
Date

___________________________________
Signature of Participant

______________________________
Signature of Researcher

Statement of Consent to Use Video Recording:
Your signature below indicates that you have read the information provided above, have had an
opportunity to ask questions about it, and agree to allow the video recording made of your group
discussion to be coded and/or transcribed, after which it will be destroyed.
_____________________________
Signature of Participant

______________________________
Date

_____________________________
Signature of Researcher

______________________________
Date
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Task instruction.
We ask you now to start brainstorming in a group of three people. Brainstorming is a popular
technique that is widely used in a large number of US corporations to facilitate idea generation.

The following four rules for brainstorming have been developed. We want you to apply these
rules while working in your group.

(1) No-Criticism: Criticism is ruled out. No evaluative judgments of any ideas are permitted.
(2) Quantity: Quantity is desired. The more ideas the better
(3) Free-Wheeling: Free-wheeling is welcomed. The wilder the ideas the better.
(4) Stay-focused on the task: Members should stay focused and persist at the task even when
productivity is low.

The goal of the brainstorming task is to invent as many ideas as possible on the following topic:

How can Loyola University Chicago be improved?
Your group is supposed to write down your group’s own ideas. To do so, your group gets some
lined sheets of paper. Please note just one idea per line in order. Your group has 15 minutes for
brainstorming.

Important: Mention each new idea you have aloud to the other group members. Afterwards
write it down on the sheets of paper. As soon as a certain idea has been mentioned and noted by
one group member (scribe), it is not allowed to mention and note it a second time. In other
words, each idea only counts once. If the same idea is noted by your group, the repetitions will
be judged as invalid.
In case you have further questions, you can address the experimenter now.

APPENDIX M
STUDY 2 MANIPULATION OF GLOBAL VS. LOCAL FOCUS

102

103

 Sample items to prime a Global focus

 Sample items to prime a Local focus

.
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1. Dorms and housing (e.g., cost, rules and policies, and options of on- and off-campus housing)
2. Food (e.g., meal options, quality, hygiene, and pricing of on- and off-campus eating)
3. Maintenance (e.g., snow plowing, water drain, janitorial services, heating and cooling)
4. Commuting (e.g., policies and services for commuting students)
5. Athletics and health (e.g., wellness center, sports teams, gym, athletics)
6. Community-based or Campus-based events and programs (e.g., speakers, entertainment,
extracurricular activities, non-sport clubs, career fairs, help accommodation)
7. Instruction (e.g., professors, classes, summer school, grading, office hours, course evaluation)
8. Academic policies (e.g., admissions, academic calendar, curriculum, registration)
9. School spirit (e.g., university logo items, school mission)
10. Parking and transportation (e.g., parking availability, public transportation)
11. Computing and technology (e.g., computer lab, e-services, classroom technology)
12. Advising and counseling (e.g., academic advising, counseling and tutoring resources)
13. Financing (e.g., scholarships, campus jobs, tuition and fees, financial aid)
14. Bookstore (e.g., free textbook, merchandise)
15. Library (e.g., study space, study room)
16. Research (e.g., undergraduate and graduate research opportunities, RA’s more involved)
17. Staff (e.g., evaluation of staff, more, nicer, and more trained staff)
18. Diversity and equal opportunity (e.g., racial/ethnic diversity status, minority group support)
19. Advertisements and Press (e.g., University student newspaper, University News center)
20. Safety (e.g., campus security)
21. Campus (e.g., renovations, construction, rules and regulations, convenience services)
22. Environment (e.g., sustainability, green space, recycle, garbage, rabbit)
23. Other (e.g., an idea that does not fit into any of the above-listed categories)
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Idea Originality Rating (5-point)
5 point (Very Original) – Extremely goes beyond the improvement or revision (not simply
“more”, “easier”, “better”) of things that are already existing inside or outside Loyola University
Chicago. New & Rare Ideas.
Example: Zip line between buildings. Heated sidewalks, Heat lamps at the street lights, Better
publicity for all sports teams, Treat that non tenured teachers with equality, Hand out more
contraceptives, Personal bodyguard for each students, Loyola phoenix more transparent
4 point (Original) – Moderately goes beyond the improvement or revision (not simply “more”,
“easier”, “better”) of things that are already existing inside or outside Loyola University
Chicago. More frequent ideas than the 5-point ones.
Example: “Minority Appreciation Day”, more efforts at the university level for
diversity/minorities, Create live feed for graduation, Build tunnels. Build underground tunnels.
3 point – Slightly goes beyond the improvement or revision (simply more, easier, better, add a
new) of things that are already existing. Or the 3-point ideas could be the simple change but the
change is a little bit extreme or the idea is more elaborated than 1- or 2- point ideas.
Example: International News Center, Gender based violence awareness, Swim team in lake.
Moving pathways like in the airports to get people across campus, Less prejudice against
speakers, More student run businesses. Outdoor pool overlooking lake
2 point (Little original) – Add something new to the things that have already been inside or near
around universities. But the idea is more specific and more elaborated than 1 point ideas
Example: Amazon store pickup near Loyola, Build a new dorm that is ecofriendly, Make free
pizza for commuters actually free, For a language minor if you can skip classes because you did
well on the placement exam you should get credited those hours, Bus should come on time like it
says on the website, Better professors with teaching degrees
1 point (Least Original) – Simply add, replace, improve, or change the things that have already
been at Loyola University Chicago.
Example: Free tuition, Free stuffs, Free study abroad, Easier ways to compost or recycle, More
green space for the campus, Easier curriculum, Fix broken elevators, More elevators, A New
dining hall, Serve breakfast longer, Replace the shuttles, More sports teams
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